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INTRODUCTION

For decades, voices both on and off the island of Puerto Rico have decried
its status as an "unincorporated territory"-a legal category invented by a
fractured U.S. Supreme Court in the widely-reviled InsularCases a century ago,'
and technically unchanged by the adoption of a constitution and
"commonwealth" status in the 1950s. 2 Broad dissatisfaction with this
constitutional and political limbo-neither state nor incorporated territory,
"belonging to" but not "part of' the United States,' "foreign ... in a domestic

Faculty, Duke Law School. Thanks to June Carbone, John Coyle, Erin Delaney, Peter
t
Eckerstrom, Allan Erbsen, Sam Erman, Jill Hasday, Andy Hessick, Michael Kagan, Catherine Kim, Jason
Mazzone, Daniel Morales, Robert Rasmussen, Daniel Schwarcz, Bartholomew Sparrow, Mark Weisburd,
Deborah Weissman, and participants at workshops at DePaul University, the University of Illinois, the
University of Minnesota, and the University of North Carolina law schools. Joe Harris and Courtney
Thomson provided excellent research assistance.
1.
See Juan R. Torruella, Ruling America's Colonies: The Insular Cases, I YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 57 (2013); see also infra notes 129-1300 and sources cited therein.
Torruella, supranote 1, at 80 n.102.
2.
3.
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,287 (1901); see also Harry Pratt Judson, The Constitution
and the Territories,21 Am. MONTHLY 451 (1900).
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sense" 4-might suggest a strong case for independence. But when Puerto Rico
held a plebiscite about its status in 1998, independence proved to be the least
popular of all the available options: only 2.5 percent of voters preferred it, while
46.5 percent preferred statehood.
Nearly twenty years later, Puerto Rico's relationship to the rest of the
United States is again in the headlines and has again made its way to the Supreme
Court. A June 2017 referendum found ninety-seven percent support for
statehood; however, with just under a quarter of eligible voters participating, it
can hardly be considered the final word.6 Moreover, that vote was cast in the
midst of an extraordinary debt crisis. The island has something in the range of
seventy billion to one hundred billion dollars in outstanding debt (depending on
whether one includes unfunded pension obligations), and, especially with the
added costs of Hurricane Maria, it has no hope of being able to pay off anywhere
close to that amount absent significant external assistance.
Even as the significance of the debt crisis became clear in the spring and
summer of 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down two decisions that
reaffirmed Puerto Rico's essentially colonial status.8 In one, the Court held that
Puerto Rico could not take advantage of the same municipal bankruptcy options
as those available to U.S. states.9 In the other, the Court held that Puerto Rico,
unlike a state, is not a separate "sovereign" for purposes of double jeopardy.10
Puerto Rico's debt crisis and its treatment at the Supreme Court add new

4.
Downes, 182 U.S. at 341.
5.
Puerto Ricans Say "No" to Statehood, CNN (Dec. 14, 1998), http://www.cnn.com/
WORLD/americas/9812/14/puerto.rico.01.
6.
Frances Robles, Despite Vote in Favor, Puerto Rico Faces a Daunting Road Toward
Statehood, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/12/us/trump-puerto-ricostatehood-congress.html.
7.
See Mitu Gulati & Robert Rasmussen, Puerto Rico and the NetherworldofSovereign Debt
Restructuring,91 S. CAL. L. REv. 133 (2017); Eric Platt, New PuertoRico GovernorSeeks Amicable Debt
Crisis Resolution, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/d9551584-de66-1 1e6-86acf253db7791c6. On the unfunded pension obligations, see Nick Brown, Puerto Rico's Other Crisis:
Impoverished Pensions, REUTERS (Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/specialreport/usa-puertorico-pensions.
8.
See, e.g., Noah Feldman, Supreme Court Affirms that Puerto Rico Really is a Colony,
BLOOMBERG (June 14, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-06-14/supreme-courtaffirms-that-puerto-rico-is-really-a-u-s-colony; Mark Joseph Stern, Second-Class Sovereignty, SLATE
(Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and_politics/supreme-court dispatches/2016/01/
the supreme courtconsiderspuerto rico s sovereigntyin sanchez valle.html; cf Jos6 A. Cabranes,
Some Common Ground, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO

RICO, AMERICAN

EXPANSION, AND

THE CONSTITUTION 39, 40-41 (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001) [hereinafter
FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE] ("Speaking plainly and honestly about our history requires us to
acknowledge, without rancor and without embarrassment, that colonialism is a simple and perfectly useful
word to describe a relationship between a powerful metropolitan state and a poor overseas dependency
that does not participate meaningfully in the formal lawmaking processes that shape the daily lives of its
people."); Juan R. Torruella, The Insular Cases: A Declaration of Their Bankruptcy and My Harvard
Pronouncement, in RECONSIDERING THE INSULAR CASES: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN

IMPERIALISM 61, 66 (Gerald L. Neuman & Tomiko-Brown Nagin eds., 2015) [hereinafter
RECONSIDERING THE INSULAR CASES] ("[T]he relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States is
a colonial one and . .. the resolution of this conundrum that is Puerto Rico's colonial condition is of prime
relevance to the invalidation of the Insular Cases and all that emanates from them.").
9.
See Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016).
10. See Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016).
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urgency to resolving its relationship to the United States.'" It would be best, of
course, if Puerto Rico and the federal government could come to a mutually
acceptable agreement on its status. And just a few years ago, the President's Task
Force on Puerto Rico's Status suggested that the President would follow the
island's lead: "The policy of the Federal executive branch has long been that
Puerto Rico's status should be decided by the people of Puerto Rico."1 2 Some
have suggested that such agreement is not only desirable, but necessary." The
same Task Force, in fact, concluded that "if a change of status is chosen by the
people of . .. Puerto Rico, such a choice must be implemented through legislation
enacted by Congress and signed by the President." 1 4
But what if agreement continues to prove impossible or, perhaps in
response to recent developments, the situation deteriorates?' 5 In the wake of the
debt crisis and the loss of the special federal tax status for corporations located
in Puerto Rico,16 it seems plausible that Puerto Ricans have even more reasons

11. See Richard Thornburgh, Puerto Rican Separatism and United States Federalism, in
FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE, supra note 8, at 349, 350 ("The attempt to create a new category of state
in union with the United States but with separate nationality under the American flag has failed and cannot
succeed under the constitution and government structure of the United States."); Juan R. Torruella, One
Hundred Years of Solitude: PuertoRico's American Century, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE, supra

note 8, at 241, 241 ("[Tlhe current commonwealth status is necessarily and unavoidably modifiable at the
will of Congress, and that commonwealth status therefore is not and cannot become a permanent solution
to the status dilemma."); Torruella, supranote 8, at 74 ("It is now an unassailable fact that what we have
in the United States-Puerto Rico relationship is government without the consent or participation of the
governed. I cannot imagine a more egregious civil rights violation, particularly in a country that touts
itself as the bastion of democracy throughout the world. This is a situation that cannot, and should not, be
further tolerated.").
12.

REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON PUERTO RICO's STATUS

18 (2011),

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/PuertoRicoTaskForceReport.pdf
The U.N. has passed resolutions to this effect at least seventeen times since 1952. In November 1953, the
U.S. Representative to the U.N. General Assembly said: "I am authorized to say on behalf of the President
that, if at any time the Legislative Assembly of Puerto Rico adopts a resolution in favor of more complete
or even absolute independence, he will immediately thereafter recommend to Congress that such
independence be granted." Statement by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. Representative to the Gen.
Assembly, U.S. Relationship with Puerto Rico, Nov. 27, 1953, DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec. 1953, at 841.
13. Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall, Between the Foreign and the Domestic: The
Doctrine ofTerritorialIncorporation,Invented and Reinvented, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE, supra

note 8, at 1, 17 ("It is widely agreed that both Congress and a majority of the inhabitants of the territory
must consent to any resolution to the current colonial situation and that the terms of a transition out of the
current status must be acceptable to both sides."); Danica Coto, Puerto Rico's New Gov Promises
Immediate Push from Statehood, MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 2, 2017), http://www.miarniherald.com/news/
nation-world/world/americas/articlel24159919.html ("The U.S. government has final say on whether
Puerto Rico can become a state.").
14.

REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON PUERTO RIco's STATUS, supra note 12, at

15.

Cf BARTHOLOMEW H. SPARROW, THE INSULAR CASES

18.
AND THE EMERGENCE OF

AMERICAN EMPIRE 248 (2006) ("[W]e can imagine Congress and the Court coming to a new
understanding with respect to the United States' island territories and the difficult ambiguous position that
they (and Washington, D.C.) occupy in the political system and the U.S. Constitution. Harder to imagine
is how the constitutionally unique arrangements in the different territories, just like those on American
Indian reservations and in the District of Columbia, can be improved upon to the satisfaction of both
territorial inhabitants and the interests of members of Congress and the executive branch.").
16.
See Mary Wiliams Walsh & Liz Moyer, How PuertoRico is Grapplingwith a Debt Crisis,
N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/business/dealbook/puerto-ricodebt-bankruptcy.html ("Corporate tax breaks designed to spur economic growth for Puerto Rico expired
in 2006, and manufacturing and other business activity began to leave the island. When jobs started
leaving, people followed or lost their jobs, reducing Puerto Rico's tax revenue. The government filled the
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to support statehood,17 and indeed, the island's new governor has made statehood
his top priority.18
However, these same factors might lead voters on the mainland to resist
Puerto Rican statehood or even to want to expel the island. 19 On the same day
that the United States elected Donald Trump as President (although, of note,
Puerto Ricans living on the island have no vote in the presidential election
despite being U.S. citizens), Puerto Rico chose a governor for whom statehood
is foremost on the agenda. If Puerto Rico's new government were to demand
statehood, could the Trump Administration say no? Even if the President were
in favor, might Congress block statehood for fear that giving two Senate seats
and five House seats to Puerto Rico would result in a loss of Republican control?
More radically, could the United States do as Britain and the Netherlands have
done with some of their colonies 20 and essentially mandate independence for
Puerto Rico or other U.S. territories like Guam or the Northern Marianas
Islands? 21

gaps by borrowing even more.").
17. Approximately forty-seven percent of Puerto Ricans supported statehood in the 1998
referendum. Puerto Ricans Say "No" to Statehood, supra note 5. In the 2012 referendum, nearly twothirds of the voters who selected a preferred alternative status selected statehood. Roque Planas, Puerto
Rico Status Vote Proposed by White House, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 18, 2014),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/10/puerto-rico-status-vote_n_3056579.html; see also Danica
Coto, Puerto Rico s Campaign to Become the 51st State May be About To Get a Big Boost, L.A. TIMES
(Nov. 6, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-puerto-rico-20161103-story.html;
Danica Coto, Amid Crisis, Support Growsfor PuertoRico Statehood, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 30,2016),
https://apnews.com/el87bf2e601f42ada69d615b0cab1f98; Cristina Silva, 52 States ofAmerica? Puerto
Rico and Washington DC Voters Want Statehood, INT'L BUS. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2016),
http://www.ibtimes.com/52-states-america-puerto-rico-washington-dc-voters-want-statehood-2444748.
18. Puerto Rico: Pro-StatehoodCandidateRicardo Rosselld Wins GovernorRace, NBC NEWS
(Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/puerto-rico-pro-statehood-candidate-ricardorossell-wins-govemor-race-n680576. Puerto Rico's nonvoting delegate in the U.S. House of
Representatives has also supported statehood. See Pedro R. Pierluisi, Statehood for Puerto Rico Now,
N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2015, at A19.
19. See, e.g., Coto, supra note 13; Andy Uhler, Puerto Rico's Governor Pushes Statehood To
Cut Debt, MARKETPLACE (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.marketplace.org/2017/01/04/world/puerto-rico-sgovemor-pushes-statehood-cut-debt. A recent article on the debt crisis had the following illustrative
quotation:
To many residents of the mainland United States, separation between the USA and Puerto Rico
seems like a natural solution to the island's financial woes as well as the most logical resolution
of an anomalous constitutional situation. After all, the empire-building and thirst for military
bases that led the United States to take Puerto Rico away from Spain in 1898 are long since
obsolete . . . and securing a reputation for the island as a deadbeat is unlikely to inspire the
mainland United States to become excited about statehood.
Matthew Yglesias, The Puerto Rico Crisis, Explained, Vox (May 2, 2016), http://www.vox.com/2015/
7/1/8872553/puerto-rico-crisis.
20.

GERT OOSTINDIE & INGE KLINKERS, DECOLONISING THE CARIBBEAN: DUTCH POLICIES IN

A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 56 (2003) ("[U]nlike London and The Hague, Washington has never
insisted that its Caribbean territories accept independence-in fact the opposite is true."); see also Godfrey
Baldacchino, The Micropolity Sovereignty Experience: Decolonizing But Not Disengaging, in EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION AND POSTCOLONIAL SOVEREIGNTY GAMES 53 (Rebecca Adler-Nissen & Ulrik Pram Gad
eds., 2013).
21. One might dismiss the talk as idle, but economically motivated expulsions have been a topic
of discussion in the context of other recent economic crises. See, e.g., Rainer Buergin, Schauble Tells Lew
He'd Gladly Swap Greecefor Puerto Rico, BLOOMBERG (July 9, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2015-07-09/schaeuble-tells-lew-he-d-gladly-swap-greece-for-puerto-rico (quoting German
politician Wolfgang Schauble at a Deutsche Bundesbank conference on July 9, 2015, saying, "I offered
my friend Jack Lew . . that we could take Puerto Rico into the euro zone [sic] if the U.S. were willing to
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Some may recoil at the suggestion, but it takes work to show why this
would be legally impermissible. 22 There is, after all, historical precedent for
nations "granting" independence to colonies that have not demanded it.2 3 The
United States is, like most countries, a product of cessions and transfers, 24 and
centuries of practice suggest that nations have near-total control over their own
borders. Is there a newly developed principle of international law, or some
domestic constitutional rule, that would prevent expulsion today?
The answers to these questions suggest something deeper about the law of
sovereignty. We argue that colonies in general, and the people of Puerto Rico in
particular, have a legal right to determine their own futures vis-A-vis their
colonial powers-whether that means pulling away or pulling closer.
This may sound sensible enough in light of long-standing domestic policy
approving statehood and growing international support for the principle of selfdetermination. But establishing a firm basis for a legal right is not easy. Puerto
Rico is not a state, and there is some reason to think that the Insular Cases were
written in part to preserve the U.S. government's option to "de-annex" (i.e., to
expel) the island.25
Similar issues have arisen in the context of other U.S. territories. 26 The
Philippine Islands were acquired under the same treaty as Puerto Rico. Decades
after its independence movement had been brutally suppressed,27 the Philippines
was made independent and the U.S. nationality of its residents was revoked.28
By then, the distant colony had become too expensive to administer, and too

take Greece into the dollar union," and noting that Lew, the U.S. Treasury Secretary, "thought that was a
joke," according to Schauble).
22.
See Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Forced Secessions, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 215
(2017) (arguing for limits on the historical power to cede territory, while noting that traditional readings
of international law would generally permit it).
See generally OOSTINDIE & KLINKERS, supra note 20 (describing treatment of Caribbean
23.
colonies). On the economics and politics of decolonization, see Erik Gartzke & Dominic Rohner, The
PoliticalEconomy ofImperialism, Decolonization and Development, 41 BRIT. J. POL. ScI. 525, 526, 53137 (2011) ("The appeal of colonial holdings evaporated for leading nations by the mid-twentieth
century.").

24.

Joseph Blocher, Selling State Borders, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 241, 245-46 (2014).

25.

Christina Duffy Burnett, UntiedStates: American Expansionand TerritorialDeannexation,

72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797 (2005); see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have the
Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States .... ); Jose A. CABRANES, CITIZENSHIP AND THE AMERICAN EMPIRE:
NOTES ON THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP OF PUERTO RICANS 50 (1979)

("[T]he doctrine seemed to leave open the possibility that, for one reason or another, the United States
might 'dispose' of its insular territories."); Simeon E. Baldwin, The ConstitutionalQuestions Incident to
the Acquisition and Government by the United States of Island Territory, 12 HARV. L. REV. 393, 409
(1899) (making the same argument and suggesting that a "conqueror" of territory "may not be able to
reftrain what he receives").

26. See Christina Duffy Burnett, The Edges of Empire and the Limits on Sovereignty, 57 AM.
Q. 779 (2005).
27.
E.g., Reynaldo C. Ileto, The Philippine-American War: Friendship and Forgetting, in
VESTIGES OF WAR: THE PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN WAR AND THE AFTERMATH OF AN IMPERIAL DREAM

1899-1999, at 3, 6-7 (Angel Velasco Shaw & Luis H. Francia eds., 2002).
See Jones Act (Philippine Islands), ch. 416, 39 Stat. 545 (1916) (declaring intention of the
28.
United States to recognize the independence of the Philippine Islands in the preamble); Treaty of General
Relations and Protocol ("Treaty of Manila of 1946"), 61 Stat. 1174, T.1.A.S. 1568, 7 U.N.T.S. 3 (1946).
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many poor Filipinos were migrating to the U.S. mainland. 29 It is not hard to
imagine the same arguments being made today about Puerto Rico.
International law can provide some guidance on these issues. After all,
international law has played a role in justifying Puerto Rico's existing
relationship with the rest of the United States. The initial relationship was the
product of a conception of international law that allowed nations-particularly
the imperial powers-to do what they wished with sovereign territory: steal
from, sell, cede, or ultimately abandon such territory without the approval of the
territory's residents. 30 The Insular Cases themselves invoked international law
regarding the legitimacy of Western nations exercising authority over their less
civilized colonial subjects while keeping them at arm's length.3 1
But international law changed fundamentally in the aftermath of World
War II, and the United States was a leader in urging the changes. 32 In the post1945 era, and under the United Nations Charter and associated human rights
treaties, it is no longer acceptable to treat former colonies as property, subject
entirely to the whims of the colonizer. 33 As part of this fundamental shift in the
global order, the imperial powers were required to give independence to colonies
with valid claims to it. 34 We have argued elsewhere that this political and legal
transformation also included a right of colonies to resist unwanted
"independence" and to remain part of the metropole-an alternative form of selfdetermination. 3 5

29.

See, e.g., H.W. BRANDS, BOUND TO EMPIRE: THE UNITED STATES AND THE PHILIPPINES

160 (1992).
30.
Most relevant for present purposes, as a result of the United States winning the SpanishAmerican War, Spain ceded a number of its colonies, including Puerto Rico, to the United States in the
Treaty of Paris. Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain, U.S.Spain, art. IX, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754.
31.
See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 300 (1901) (White, J., concurring); see also Sam
Erman, Meanings ofCitizenship in the U.S. Empire: PuertoRico, Isabel Gonzalez and the Supreme Court,
1898 to 1905, 27 J. AM. ETHNIC HIST. 5, 9-10 (2008); Chimine I. Keitner, From Conquest to Consent:
Puerto Rico and the Prospect of Genuine Free Association, in RECONSIDERING THE INSULAR CASES,

supra note 8, at 77, 81 (pointing to Justice White having drawn from Henry Wagner Halleck's treatise on
international law for the rights of Western nations to acquire territory and fully determine the fate of that
territory); Kal Raustiala, Empire and Extraterritorialityin 20th Century America, 40 Sw. L. REV. 605,
606-11 (2011) (similar).
32. Keitner, supra note 31. Eleanor Roosevelt was a key player in getting the first international
bill of human rights adopted by the United Nations in 1948. See MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE
NEw: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001). As most

will guess, the history of this move was far more complicated than a simple articulation that the global
community had decided that colonialism was bad. See Mark Mazover, The Strange Triumph of Human
Rights, 47 HIST. J. 379 (2004).
33.
See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, openedfor
signatureDec. 16, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976);
see alsoAndrea Bianchi, Human Rights andthe Magic ofJus Cogens, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 491, 491 (2008)
(discussing the almost intrinsic relationship between human rights and jus cogens norms).
34. An example is the pressure that was put on the Franco regime in Spain in the 1960s to give
up its colonial holdings in Africa, such as the Western Sahara. See Jennifer Labella, The Western Sahara
Conflict: A Case Study ofU.N. Peacekeeping in the PostCold War World, 29 UFAMU 67, 69 (2003).
35. Blocher & Gulati, supra note 22. For more detailed accounts, see Erez Manela, THE
WILSONIAN MOMENT: SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORIGINS OF ANTICOLONIAL

NATIONALISM (2007) and Jan Eckel, Human Rights and Decolonization: New Perspectives and Open
Questions, 1 HUMANITY 124 (2010).
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The United States therefore had to choose to either give up its colonies or
represent to the international system-the United Nations, in particular-that the
colonies were being given full rights to self-determination. In economic terms,
the United States had to decide whether to "make" or to "buy" whatever value
Puerto Rico was providing, since "steal" was off the table. The United States
could have decided to give Puerto Rico independence and entered into contracts
with it for military bases (as it did with the Philippines and Cuba-the "buy"
decision), but Puerto Rico was considered strategically important enough that
the United States wanted full control and not just a contractual relationship.
Thus, the choice was to "make" or incorporate. 37 The price of fully bringing
Puerto Rico into the United States should have included granting further rights
to the Puerto Rican people, both individually and collectively. As a practical
matter, this was done to some degree in 1952 when the United States entered into
a "compact" with Puerto Rico, allowing it to have its own domestic constitutional
structure, and reported to the United Nations that the compact "expressly
recognized the principle of government by consent."3 8
Whether and under what conditions the United States can expel Puerto
Rico, or continue to hold it at arm's length, is partly a function of that compact's
terms. Specifically, what was the implicit promise being made by the more
powerful actor to the weaker partner in the bilateral relationship? That implicit
deal, we believe, could not have been that Puerto Rico could be kicked out of the
Union at the whim of the U.S. Congress, nor that it could perpetually be held at
arm's length.
Part I provides a legal and historical overview of Puerto Rico's status visi-vis the rest of the United States. Our focus is on the degree to which legal and
political developments, including the Insular Cases, have arguably emphasized
and preserved the United States' authority to keep Puerto Rico at arm's length,
and even to expel it.
Part II turns to international law. However, Puerto Rico's semi-sovereign
status complicates the analysis. Whether one considers Puerto Rico to be an
independent sovereign in a treaty with the mainland or instead "part of' the
United States, traditional readings of international law would not prohibit
expulsion.39 We argue, however, that contemporary international law requires
that Puerto Rico's wishes be taken into account. Indeed, the values underlying
self-determination suggest that Puerto Ricans should have the ultimate say in
whether to be more closely associated with the United States.
On the application of the "make or buy" conception to trades in sovereignty, see Paul B.
36.
Stephan, Blocher, Gulati and Coase: Making or Buying Sovereignty, 66 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 51 (2017).
37.

See, e.g., Ramon Grosfoguel, COLONIAL SUBJECTS: PUERTO RICANS IN A GLOBAL

PERSPECTIVE 49-53 (2003).
38.
For a detailed discussion, see Keitner, supranote 31, at 86-94.
39.
Blocher & Gulati, supra note 22, at 230-41 (discussing traditional rules regarding expulsion
from States); Joseph Blocher, Mitu Gulati & Laurence Helfer, Can Greece be Expelled From the
Eurozone? Towarda Default Rule on Expulsionfrom InternationalOrganizations, in FILLING THE GAPS

IN GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF EUROPE 127, 138-46 (Franklin Allen et al. eds., 2016) (discussing
traditional rules regarding expulsion from international organizations); see also Jens Dammann, Paradise
Lost: Can the European Union Expel Countries From the Eurozone?, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 693
(2016).
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In Part III, we consider domestic constitutional limitations on either
expelling Puerto Rico or denying it statehood. Our analysis here is more
tentative. We conclude that the U.S. Constitution does not prohibit expulsion of
unincorporated territories, and yet the Constitution also does not rule out the
proposition that Puerto Rico has a right to demand statehood. (Whether that right
is ultimately justiciable is a separate question.) 4 0 That, in turn, raises questions
about whether, if ever, a state could be expelled from the Union.
I. THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL STATUS OF PUERTO RICO
On February 15, 1898, the U.S.S. Maine exploded in a Cuban harbor. The
fire and smoke over Havana that night helped inaugurate the Spanish-American
War-a "splendid little war" fought nominally to secure Cuban independence
from Spain, 4 1 and which was over by Christmas of that year. In the Treaty of
Paris, Spain ceded Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines to the United
States.
In ways that are perhaps unimaginable today, the acquisition of these
territories made empire a part of the American political consciousness, to the
degree that "[t]he election of 1900 largely turned upon the so-called issue of
Imperialism." 4 2 The end of the war cemented the United States' status as a world
power; never before and never since has it controlled so much territory. 43 But
while expansion was on the minds of many, 44 the acquisition of Spain's
Caribbean and Pacific territories also raised the question of whether the United
States could dispose of its new territories. As President McKinley put it in 1898:
"While we are conducting war ... we must keep all we can get; when the war is
over we must keep what we want." 4 5 For a variety of reasons, Cuba and the
Philippines did not remain under U.S. control.46 Puerto Rico and Guam still are.
40. See infra Part IV.
41. Rogers M. Smith, The BitterRoots ofPuerto Rican Citizenship, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC
SENSE, supra note 8, at 373, 375 (noting that the war "did not arise from any great economic or military
necessity pressing on any party involved. It resulted essentially from the desires of some U.S. leaders to
win a war, build a larger empire, and prove to the European powers that [white] Americans, too, were one
of 'the great masterful races,' as the feisty Teddy Roosevelt put it").
42. Duffy Burnett & Marshall, supranote 13, at 4 (quoting Frederic R. Coudert, The Evolution
of the Doctrineof TerritorialIncorporation,60 AM. L. REV. 801 (1926)); see also CABRANES, supranote
25, at 4 ("The expansion of American power and influence precipitated a great national debate on
imperialism, a debate that moved the nation for several years before and after the Spanish-American War
and dominated the presidential election campaign of 1900."). But see SPARROW, supra note 15, at 10809. See generally NOEL MAURER, THE EMPIRE TRAP: THE RISE AND FALL OF U.S. INTERVENTION TO
PROTECT AMERICAN PROPERTY OVERSEAS 1893-2013 (2013).

43. SPARROW, supra note 15, at 216 ("[T]he United States never encompassed as large an area
as it did between March 1899 and May 1902.").
44. Remarkably, Attorney General John Griggs argued to the Supreme Court that the
government needed broad powers to annex territory because it might someday acquire "Egypt and the
Soudan [sic], or a section of Central Africa, or a spot in the Antarctic Circle, or a section of the Chinese
Empire." SPARROW, supra note 15, at 142.
45. 2 CHARLES S. OLCOTT, THE LIFE OF WILLIAM MCKINLEY 165 (1916); see also SPARROW,
supra note 15, at 217 ("The lesson from Cuba was that the United States did not have to keep all the area
that it acquired; the United States could also let territory go.").
46. See CABRANES, supra note 25, at 2 n.4 ("A policy of forcible annexation such as was
effected in Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines was not possible in the case of Cuba because of the
self-denying proclamations that accompanied the American call to arms."); id. at 2-3 n.5 (noting that
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Leading constitutional scholars addressed the question of sovereign
territory not only as a thought experiment for political theorists but also as a
pressing and immediate challenge for lawyers. Five remarkable articles
published in the HarvardLaw Review in 1898 and 1899 by luminaries like Abbot
Lawrence Lowell, C.C. Langdell, and James Bradley Thayer helped lay the
groundwork for the U.S. Supreme Court's ultimate resolution of the issue. 47 Not
one of them thought that Puerto Rico's status was for Puerto Ricans to determine.
How striking, then, that the issue has so far receded from political and legal
consciousness that most Americans probably cannot identify Puerto Rico's
status, let alone account for the United States' other territories. 4 8 The past decade
has seen an increase in scholarly attention to Puerto Rico, 49 but Sanford
Levinson's observation is likely still accurate: most constitutional law professors
are probably not familiar with the Insular Casesso-the foundational Supreme
Court cases that, between 1901 and 1922, created the legal category of
unincorporated territorial status and relegated Puerto Rico to it.51 Though
criticized from nearly all quarters, the cases still provide the foundation for the
legal status of Puerto Rico, 52 as recent Supreme Court cases demonstrate.53
A.

Annexation and the Creation of "UnincorporatedTerritory"

The annexation of Puerto Rico following the Spanish-American War raised
the question of the island's status vis-t-vis the rest of the nation. Would it be a
state, and its residents U.S. citizens? Would it be the property of the
mainlanders? Would it, like Cuba (and, eventually, the Philippines), officially be
given independence? And, if none of the above, how long could the island be
held in legal and political limbo?

"[a]lthough not as well known at first, the Filipinos' aspirations for independence were no less firm than
those of the Cubans" and that the U.S. conflict with the Philippines was more costly than the SpanishAmerican War itself (citations omitted)); SPARROW, supra note 15, at 70 (arguing that "important
American business interests . . together with their congressmen and senators opposed the United States'
annexation of Cuba"); id. at 37 ("The war in the Philippines (1899-1902) cost hundreds of millions of
dollars and demanded 70,000 U.S. troops at the peak . . . .").
47. Baldwin, supra note 25; C.C. Langdell, The Status of Our New Territories, 12 HARV. L.
REv. 365 (1899); Abbott Lawrence Lowell, The Status ofOur.New Possessions-A Third View, 13 HARV.
L. REV. 155 (1899); Carman F. Randolph, ConstitutionalAspects ofAnnexation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 291
(1898); James Bradley Thayer, Our New Possessions, 12 HARV. L. REV. 464 (1899). When writing about
the Insular Cases, it is obligatory to note that they inspired Mr. Dooley's famous aphorism, "no matter
whether th' constitution follows th' flag or not, the supreme coort follows th' iliction returns." F.P. Dunne,
MR. DOOLEY ON THE CHOICE OF LAW 52 (E.J. Bander ed., 1963).

48.

SPARROW, supra note 15, at 9.

49.

See, e.g., RECONSIDERING THE INSULAR CASES, supra note 8; Samuel Issacharoff et al.,

What is Puerto Rico?, (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law Research Paper No. 18-02, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3103932.
50.
Sanford Levinson, Installing the Insular Cases into the Canon of ConstitutionalLaw, in
FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE, supra note 8, at 121, 123.

SPARROW, supra note 15, at 5 ("Observers at the time reported that the Insular Cases
51.
aroused more political passion than had any action by the Supreme Court since its decision in Dred Scott
v. Sandford (1857)."); John W. Davis, Edward Douglass White, 7 AM. BAR. ASSOC. J. 377, 378 (1921)
(calling the cases "the most hotly contested and long continued duel in the life of the Supreme Court").
52.
See Bartholomew H. Sparrow, The Centennial of Ocampo v. United States: Lessonsfrom
the Insular Cases, in RECONSIDERING THE INSULAR CASES, supra note 8, at 39, 45.

53.

See infra Section I.C.
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In the immediate aftermath of annexation-which Puerto Ricans did not
initially resist 4-Puerto Rico's political leaders preferred statehood.5 5 But in
1900, those hopes were dashed when Congress passed the Foraker Act, 5 6 whose
sponsor said it was designed "to recognize that Puerto Rico belongs to the United
States of America." 57 The Act made clear that Puerto Rico was not only not a
state but was also disadvantaged even compared to other territories. As Christina
Duffy Ponsa-Kraus notes:
[M]ost significantly, Congress declined to extend the US Constitution by statute to
Puerto Rico, as it had done in all prior territories, and instead of granting US
citizenship to the island's inhabitants, it declared native-born Puerto Ricans "citizens
of Porto Rico," a nebulous and undefined status that seemed to amount to little more
than an embellished form of statelessness.58
Questions of citizenship and statehood were intertwined from the moment of
annexation. 5 9 Article IX of the Treaty of Paris took away the Spanish citizenship
of the territories' residents but did not guarantee U.S. citizenship. Instead, the
terms of the Treaty simply provided that "[t]he civil rights and political status of
the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be
determined by the Congress." 60 This was potentially a significant change, since
Puerto Ricans had been entitled to rights in the Spanish system, 61 and it was the
54. CABRANES, supra note 25, at 3 n.5 ("In marked contrast [to Cuba and the Philippines], Guam
and Puerto Rico generally welcomed the occupying forces and, for a considerable time, did not resist
American rule.") (citations omitted); OOSTINDIE & KLINKERS, supra note 20, at 45 ("A strong
independence movement remained absent-in stark contrast to its culturally similar 'sister island'
Cuba.").
55.
Christina Duffy Ponsa, When Statehood was Autonomy, in RECONSIDERING THE INSULAR
CASES, supra note 8, at 1, 3.
56.
Organic Act of 1900 (Foraker Act), ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77 (1900) (codified as amended in
various sections of 48 U.S.C. (2013)).
57.
33 CONG. REc. 2473 (1900) (statement of Sen. Foraker) (emphasis added); see also Ponsa,
supra note 55, at 27-28 ("The rejection of Puerto Rican statehood by the United States led to the demise
of Puerto Rico's autonomist constitutionalism as it stood at the end of the nineteenth century. . . . The
effect was to strip the autonomists not only of their hopes but also of their ideas.").
58.
Ponsa, supra note 55, at 27.
59.

GARY LAWSON

& Guy SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL

EXPANSION & AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 194 (2004) ("Anyone who is at all familiar with the history of
territorial governance knows that anything resembling the constitutional analysis described above sank to
the bottom ofManila Bay along with the Spanish fleet in 1898. After 1898, territorial inhabitants do not
necessarily get the benefit of constitutional provisions that seem, by their terms, to apply to them.... The
modern doctrine makes no sense on its face, and it makes even less sense the deeper one digs into it."); E.
Robert Statham Jr., US. Territorial Expansion: Extended Republicanism Versus Hyperextended
Expansionism, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE, supra note 8, at 167, 173 ("States are created by people
and are subsequently admitted into the Union. Territory is property, and is, therefore, distinct from people
and citizenship."); id. at 177 ("To contend that the Constitution (and the Territorial Clause in particular)
gives complete power over and ownership of territorial acquisitions and their inhabitants is to treat
inhabitants as property to be disposed of at the pleasure of Congress, a single branch of the national
government ..... Whereas the United States has the right to acquire territory, it has no right whatsoever
to acquire people.").
60.
Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain, U.S.Spain, art. IX, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754.
61. Jos6 Trias Monge, Injustice According to Law: The Insular Cases and Other Oddities, in
FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE, supra note 8, at 226, 231 ("Puerto Ricans were Spanish citizens, equal
in all respects to mainland Spanish citizens. The Spanish Constitution applied in Puerto Rico in the same
manner as in Spain proper. Puerto Rico had as full a right to representation as any other province of
Spain."); Smith, supra note 41, at 375 (noting that Puerto Rican home rule status was only conferred in
1897, before which "most Puerto Ricans, it seems, had long been content to be Spanish subjects, without
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first time that "in a treaty acquiring territory for the United States, there was no
promise of citizenship . .. [nor any] promise, actual or implied, of statehood." 62
The terms of the treaty for the Louisiana Purchase, by contrast, provided
something of a guarantee of resolution: "The inhabitants of the ceded territory
shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as
possible according to the principles of the Federal [C]onstitution." 63
In 1916, Puerto Rico's resident commissioner, Luis Mufioz Rivera,
articulated a position held by many of the island's political elites, by trying to
connect citizenship and statehood: "Give us statehood and your glorious
citizenship will be welcome to us and to our children. If you deny us statehood,
we decline your citizenship, frankly, proudly, as befits a people who . . . will
preserve their conception of honor, which none can take from them . . . ."64
The Jones Act of 1917 eventually conferred U.S. citizenship on Puerto
Ricans (apparently because additional men were needed to fight in World War
165). The Act also separated the three branches of Puerto Rican government and
created a locally elected bicameral legislature. 6 6 After the Jones Act, it was still
"widely believed that it would only be a matter of time until this 'transitory
phase' would end in statehood." 67 But as Judge Jos6 Cabranes notes, "[T]he
citizenship that was granted was not complete," and the "very word 'citizenship'
suggested equality of rights and privileges and full membership in the American
political community, thereby obscuring the colonial relationship between a great
metropolitan state and a poor overseas dependency." 68 Judge Cabranes
concludes that "[b]y extending United States citizenship to the Puerto Ricans
after promising independence to the Filipinos, Congress intended to do little

a legally recognized, independent Puerto Rican nationality").
62.
Juan F. Perea, Fulfilling Manfest Destiny: Conquest, Race, and the Insular Cases, in
FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE, supra note 8, at 156 (quoting J. PRATT, AMERICA'S COLONIAL
EXPERIMENT 68 (1950)); CABRANES, supranote 25, at 20-21.
63.
Treaty of Purchase Between the United States and the French Republic, Fr.-U.S., art. III,
Apr. 30, 1803, 8 Stat. 200, 202; see also Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the
Republic of Mexico, U.S.-Mex., art. IX, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922, 930 ("[The Mexicans] ... shall be
incorporated in the Union of the United States, and be admitted at the proper time (to be judged by the
Congress of the United States) to the enjoyment of all the rights of citizens of the United States according
to the principles of the Constitution."); Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits Between the United States
of America and His Catholic Majesty, Spain-U.S., art. VI, Feb. 22, 1819, 18 Stat. 712, 714 ("The
inhabitants of the territories which His Catholic Majesty cedes to the United States by this treaty, shall be
incorporated in the Union of the United States, as soon as may be consistent with the principles of the
Federal Constitution, and admitted to the enjoyment of all the privileges, rights, and immunities of the
citizens of the United States."). Even Johnson v. M'Intosh, in which Chief Justice John Marshall gave
imprimatur to the conquest ofNative Americans, noted that while "[t]he conqueror prescribes [the] limits"
of its title, "[h]umanity . . has established, as a general rule" that the condition of the conquered "shall
remain as eligible as is compatible with the objects ofthe conquest." 21 U.S. 543, 589 (1823). Specifically,
"[m]ost usually, they are incorporated with the victorious nation, and become subjects or citizens of the
government with which they are connected." Id.
64. 53 CONG. REC. 7472 (1916) (statement of Resident Comm'r Rivera).
65.
Bartholomew Sparrow & Jennifer Lamm, Puerto Ricans and US. Citizenship in 1917:
Imperatives of Security, 29 CENTRO J. 284, 285-86 (2017). By contrast, Cabranes concludes that the
extension of citizenship on the eve of war was coincidental. CABRANES, supra note 25, at 14-16.
66. Jones Act (Puerto Rico), ch. 145, sec. 5, 39 Stat. 951 (1917) (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1402 (1976)).
67.

OOSTINDIE & KLINKERS, supra note 20, at 46.

68.

CABRANES, supra note 25, at 6-7.
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more than proclaim the permanence of Puerto Rico's political links with the
United States." 69

In addition to these shaky constitutional foundations, 70 the denial of full
citizenship was partially a product of underlying racism. 7 ' Even in the language
of the Insular Cases themselves, it is easy enough to see that the Justices
regarded Puerto Ricans as a foreign population and perhaps not assimilable. In
Downes v. Bidwell, the Justices-all but two of whom had joined the decision in
Plessy v. Ferguson72 a few years earlier-wrung their hands over the "grave
questions [which] will arise from differences of race, habits, laws and customs
of the people."73 In Balzac v. Porto Rico, the Court rejected the extension of the
Sixth Amendment's jury right and found that Congress had not intended to
extend that right "of Anglo-Saxon origin" to "people like the Filipinos or Porto
Ricans, . . . living in compact and ancient communities, with definitely formed
customs and political conceptions."74 Justice Henry Billings Brown would later
conclude, "Indeed, it is doubtful if Congress would ever assent to annexation of
territory upon the condition that its inhabitants, however foreign they may be to
our habits, traditions and modes of life, shall become at once citizens of the
United States."s
There is no straightforward way to state the doctrinal result of the Insular
Cases. An oft-quoted summary comes from Justice Edward Douglass White's
opinion in Downes:
The result of what has been said is that while in an international sense Porto Rico
was not a foreign country, since it... was owned by the United States, it was foreign

to the United States in a domestic sense, because the island had not been incor orated
into the United States, but was merely appurtenantthereto as a possession.

This odd dichotomy-"foreign . . . in a domestic sense" but not "in an
international sense"-is captured by two of the decisions that make up the
Insular Cases. In Downes, the Court effectively held in a splintered set of
decisions that the Uniformity Clause (which requires uniform "Duties, Imposts
and Excises . .. throughout the United States" 77 ) does not apply to Puerto Rico.
This suggested that the island is indeed "foreign." And yet, in De Lima v.
Bidwell, the Court held that Puerto Rico did not fall within the scope of the
Dingley Act, which provided for duties on goods shipped to the United States

69.

Id. at 15.

70. See Torruella, supra note 8, at 69 ("This is clearly in direct contravention to the
Constitution-the source from which civil and political rights and status emanate, not Congress . . . .").
71.

Perea, supra note 62, at 140, 156; see, e.g., Baldwin, supra note 25, at 415 (arguing against

giving "the ignorant and lawless brigands that infest Puerto Rico" the benefits of the Constitution).
72.
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
73. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 282 (1901).
74. 258 U.S. 298, 310-11 (1922). A decade prior, President William Howard Taft suggested to
Congress that the Puerto Ricans had been given too much responsibility over governance "for their own
good." Message from President Taft to Congress (May 10, 1909), reprintedin S. REP. No. 61-10, at 5
(1909).
75.
Downes, 182 U.S. at 280.
76.
Id. at 341-42 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
77.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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from "foreign countries." 78 This reinforced the notion that Puerto Rico was not
foreign in an international sense.79
With regard to territorial status itself, the Court created what is known as
the doctrine of incorporation, which divides territories into two classes.
"Incorporated" territories are on their way to statehood and, hence, subject to the
restrictions of the Constitution. "Unincorporated" territories like Puerto Rico,
however, are not-they lack a constitutional trajectory. As Chief Justice Melville
Fuller wrote in his Downes dissent, "the contention [of the majority opinion]
seems to be that, if an organized and settled province of another sovereignty is
acquired by the United States, Congress has the power to keep it, like a
disembodied shade, in an intermediate state of ambiguous existence for an
indefinite period."8
The natural question to ask is who gets to determine the end of that
"ambiguous existence." Ponsa-Kraus and others have demonstrated the degree
to which Puerto Rico's relationship to the mainland must be understood through
the lens of the federal government's power to control that relationship.81 PonsaKraus argues that the Insular Cases' primary significance is that they "served
the aims of empire in a different and unexpected way: not by opening the door
to the annexation of American colonies, but by paving the way for their
release." 8 2 On this reading, the cases established that territories like Puerto Rico
"could be separated from the United States, or. . . 'deannexed,' as long as they
remained unincorporated. Preserving the option of deannexation was the reason
not to incorporate a territory in the first place." 83
Puerto Rico is not the only example within the United States. The Northern
Mariana Islands, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and American Samoa are also
unincorporated territories, 84 and together they cover more such territory "than is
controlled by any other country in the world." 85 As Ponsa-Kraus and Marshall
78.
182 U.S. 1 (1901).
79. At the time of Downes, Congress had passed the Foraker Act. In De Lima, the Court was
responding to executive power in the aftermath of war but before the Act had taken effect. SPARROW,
supra note 15, at 111-12.
80. Downes, 182 U.S. at 372 (1901) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
81.
See Ponsa, supra note 55.
Duffy Burnett, supra note 25, at 799.
82.
83. Id. at 802, 854 ("[T]he doctrine of territorial incorporation did have something to add to the
Court's territorial jurisprudence-namely, it established the constitutionality of territorial
deannexation."); see also Downes, 182 U.S. at 308 (White, J., concurring) ("Suppose at the termination
of a war the hostile government had been overthrown and the entire territory or a portion thereof was
occupied by the United States, and . . . it became necessary for the United States to hold the conquered
country for an indefinite period, or at least until such time as Congress deemed that it should be either
released or retained because it was apt for incorporation into the United States."); Paul R. Shipman,
Webster on the Territories,9 YALE L.J. 185, 206 (1900) (arguing that there was no moral or constitutional
obligation to retain Puerto Rico); Edward B. Whitney, The Porto Rico Tariffs of 1899 and 1900, 9 YALE
L.J. 297, 314 (1900) (arguing that annexed territory could be ceded). On the broader issues, see generally
CABRANES, supra note 25.

84.
The uninhabited atoll ofPalmyra "enjoys the curious distinction of being the only American
jurisdiction outside the fifty states and the District of Columbia to which the U.S. Constitution applies 'in
its entirety.' This is because Palmyra possess a unique legal status within the framework of U.S. law: it is
the only 'incorporated' territory of the United States." Duffy Burnett, supra note 26, at 779 (citations
omitted).
SPARROW, supra note 15, at 215-16 ("[O]nly China, with Hong Kong and Macau, has a
85.
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note:
Although each of the U.S. territories has a different status . . . they have several
features in common: Congress governs them pursuant to its power under the
Territorial Clause of the U.S. Constitution; none is a sovereign independent country
or a state of the Union; people born in the territories are U.S. citizens, or, in the case
of American Samoa, U.S. "nationals"; all are affected by federal legislation at the
sole discretion of Congress; none has representation at the federal level. 86

In the words of the Supreme Court: "The people of the United States, as
sovereign owners of the National Territories, have supreme power over them and
their inhabitants."8 7 They therefore can "belong to" the United States without
being part of it.
An analogous series of developments took place in international law at
roughly the same time that the Insular Cases were reshaping U.S. law. Martti
Koskenniemi has noted that in the decades surrounding World War I-the last
time that colonial expansion was truly prominent and open-some nations
hesitated to officially extend sovereignty over territories.88 As one critic put it,
"[G]reed and the wish for exploitation without administrative and policy costs
had led European countries to employ hypocritical techniques of annexation
without sovereignty."8 9
Human rights lawyers in the 1920s and 1930s argued strenuously that
colonies should be treated as fully subject to the sovereignty of their colonizers,
not held as possessions. 90 The latter was what happened in many contexts where
the imperial power wanted to expropriate from the overseas territory but did not
want to take on obligations to the people there (or worse, to have those people
come over to the mainland and claim rights). Koskenniemi describes the British
"protectorates" in Africa as being one example, and the British "lease" of Cyprus
as another. 91 Eric Posner describes Cuba in the early 1900s and later U.S.
relationships with vassal states in similar terms. 92
The natural question to ask is why. Just as people are thought to have an
innate desire for acquiring property, nations are generally supposed to prefer
more sovereign territory, not less; the basic rules of international law and practice
have evolved largely to address that expansionist impulse. Indeed, "[v]irtually

larger territorial population."); see also Monge, supra note 61, at 231 ("The United States, one notes with
a heavy heart, has been unaccountably slow in decolonizing its wards, slower than most modem
administering nations.").
86.
Duffy Burnett & Marshall, supra note 13, at 1-2; see also SPARROW, supra note 15, at 220
(noting "the variation that exists in the governing arrangements of the several territories").
87.
Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15,44 (1885).
88.
MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960, at 109-25 (2001).

89. Id. at 151.
90.
See id. at 109-10. The terminology in vogue at the time was "protection of minorities" rather
than "human rights." See Mark Mazower, The Strange Triumph ofHuman Rights, 1933-1950, 47 HiST. J.
379, 398 (2004).
91. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 88, at 125-51.
92. Eric A. Posner, The Limits ofLimits, NEW REPUBLIC (May 5, 2010); see also Bradley R.
Simpson, Self-Determination, Human Rights, and the End ofEmpire in the 1970s, 4 HUMANITY 239,251
(2013) (describing the conditions under which Australia gave independence to Nauru and Papua New
Guinea).
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all states and empires have treated territory as being of itself good," 9 3 and "[t]he
history of international law since the Peace of Westphalia is in significant
measure an account of the territorial temptation." 94
Why, then, would the United States choose to keep Puerto Rico at arm's
length? One important factor is that most nations powerful enough to maintain
colonies are also powerful enough to exert control more cheaply and effectively
without claiming sovereign territory,95 or by explicitly disclaiming it.96 As
Ponsa-Kraus notes, "We tend to associate imperialism with the acquisition of
territory, the projection of power, and the imposition of sovereignty. The
emphasis tends to be on expansion-more territory, plenary power, extended
sovereignty. Yet American imperialism has also consisted of efforts to impose
limits on expansion." 97
An obvious cost of territorial expansion, and therefore a reason to avoid it,
is the principle for which Downes is most commonly invoked: the extension of
constitutional law. If incorporating Puerto Rico-granting statehood, for
example-would mean that the island's residents could claim the full panoply of
constitutional rights, including birthright citizenship, 9 8 and that the island itself
would have more of a constitutionally guaranteed role in the constitutional
structure (voting representation in Congress being one), the perceived "cost" to
the rest of the United States might be high. By declining to treat Puerto Rico like
a state, while also denying it a chance to affiliate with other nations, 99 the
mainland extracted benefits without paying the costs.
More radically, though, keeping Puerto Rico at constitutional arm's length
may have been designed to preserve the United States' exit option: the power to
expel Puerto Rico-a prospect that would be more difficult, perhaps
impossible,"oo if it were to become a state. On this interpretation, the key to the
InsularCases is not how much sovereign control over Puerto Rico they approved
but how much they held back.

93.
Andrew F. Burghardt, The Bases of TerritorialClaims, 63 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 225, 225
(1973) (also quoting Niccolo Machiavelli: "[T]he wish to acquire more [territory] is admittedly a very
natural and common thing; and when men succeed in this they are always praised rather than condemned."
(footnote omitted)).
94. Bernard H. Oxman, The Territorial Temptation: A Siren Song at Sea, 100 AM. J. INT'L L.
830, 830 (2006).
95.
SPARROW, supranote 15, at 12 ("Crucial in the establishment of this nonterritorial, informal
empire was the ability of the United States to divest itself of territories."); id. at 246 ("President Roosevelt,
his advisers, and other policymakers began to realize soon after the turn of the twentieth century that they
could get the benefits of U.S. sovereignty without the costs of military occupation or territorial
annexation.").
96.
The Guano Islands Act is exemplary: "[N]othing in this chapter contained shall be construed
as obliging the United States to retain possession of the islands, rocks, or keys, after the guano shall have
been removed from the same." 48 U.S.C. § 1419.
97.
Duffy Burnett, supra note 26, at 781.
98. Lisa Maria Perez, Citizenship Denied: The Insular Cases and the FourteenthAmendment,
94 VA. L. REV. 1029 (2008).
99.
On the benefits of opening up the competition for affiliation, see Joseph Blocher & Mitu
Gulati, A Marketfor Sovereign Control, 66 DUKE L.J. 797 (2017).
100. See infra Section II.B.
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IndeterminateSelf-Determination

As a constitutional matter, the Insular Cases largely settled the status of
Puerto Rico. And by the time the last of the cases was decided in 1921, the
nation's attention had largely turned to other matters.
But on the island itself, the question of status remained paramount and
unsettled. 101 In 1948, for the first time, Puerto Rico elected its own governor,
Luis Muiftoz Marin, who would remain in power for nearly two decades at the
head of the Popular Democratic Party, also known as the Commonwealth Party.
As the name of his party suggests, Mufioz Marin presided over Puerto Rico's
transition to "commonwealth" status. This transition was approved by the
residents of Puerto Rico-76.4 percent voted in favor-and inaugurated a new
era.
However, both the legal significance and popularity of commonwealth
status remain somewhat unsettled, even after decades' worth of plebiscites and
referenda. Nearly fifty years later, in 1996, Representative Don Young
introduced a bill to present the people of Puerto Rico with a range of options that
Congress would be willing to accept. "Enhanced commonwealth" was not
among them, however, which caused "immediate and overwhelming opposition
. . . on the island."1 02 The three options instead offered were statehood,
commonwealth without "enhancements," and independence. The Young bill
eventually died in the Senate, leaving Congress's official position on the matter
unresolved. 103
Puerto Rico's government, which favored statehood, responded by
organizing a separate and nonbinding plebiscite in December 1998, which
presented a slightly different list of options: independence, "free association,"
statehood, non-enhanced commonwealth, and "none of the above." 04 Again,
enhanced commonwealth status was omitted, leading Mufioz Marn's heirs in the
Popular Democratic Party to advocate "none of the above." In the end, 50.2
percent of voters made that choice, while 46.5 percent chose statehood. 05 The
increasing support for statehood was notable, however, and when Puerto Rico
held another plebiscite (its fifth) in 2012, statehood received a plurality of
support for the first time. 1 06
Support for statehood is reflected not just in referenda, but in electoral
results. On November 8, 2016, the same day voters on the mainland chose

101. Duffy Burnett & Marshall, supra note 13, at 17; Ute Guthunz, Beyond Decolonizationand
Beyond Statehood? Puerto Rico's Political Development in Association with the United States, 21
IBEROAMERICANA 42, 48 (1997) (noting that Puerto Rican political parties define themselves through
status options).
102. Duffy Burnett & Marshall, supra note 13, at 21 (further stating, "It would be difficult to
exaggerate the divisions the Young bill caused").
103. Id. at 22.
104. See Mireya Navarro, Looking Beyond Vote in Puerto Rico After 'None of the Above' Is Top
Choice, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 15, 1998,) https://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/15/us/looking-beyond-vote-inpuerto-rico-after-none-of-the-above-is-top-choice.html.
105. Puerto Ricans Say "No" to Statehood, supra note 5.
106. R. SAM. GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42765, PUERTO RICO'S POLITICAL STATUS
AND THE 2012 PLEBISCITE: BACKGROUND AND KEY QUESTIONS 8 (2013).
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Donald Trump as the next U.S. President, Puerto Ricans elected a new governor,
Ricardo Rossell6. His New Progressive Party supports statehood (its main
competitor, the Popular Democratic Party, does not). The following day,
November 9, Rossell6 called on President-elect Trump to facilitate the move to
statehood.1 0 7 He stated that "[t]he Republican platform is very clear" in
supporting statehood if Puerto Rican voters choose it, and that "having a
Republican House [of Representatives], a Republican Senate and a Republican
108
president, there's no excuse for not carrying it out."
In keeping with his campaign promises, Rossell6's party organized a
referendum on June 11, 2017. Percentage-wise, the results were overwhelmingly
supportive of statehood-nearly ninety-seven percent of all votes cast-but only
twenty-three percent of voters turned out, leaving the implications unclear yet
again.
The next day, the New York Times reported, "By law, the next steps toward
statehood remain in Congress, where advocates for statehood face the daunting
task of persuading a legislature dominated by Republicans to take on a state
which would have the nation's highest poverty and unemployment rates and an
unpaid $74 billion debt."1 09 Whether those next steps are truly entrusted "by law"
to Congress is among the questions we address.
C.

The Resilience of the Insular Cases

In some respects, the turnaround with regard to Puerto Rico's status has
been remarkable. A century ago, the Harvard Law Review published the
aforementioned five articles that, in different ways, defended the idea of
American empire. Today one searches in vain for defenders of the Insular Cases.
In other ways, however, the cases have not lost their grip. While the U.S.
Supreme Court has overruled or minimized many other constitutional doctrines
rooted in racism and a national self-conception that we would not tolerate
today,1 10 the InsularCases remain good law. The Supreme Court's 2015-16 term
provided a few prominent illustrations. I
The first major case from the term drove home Puerto Rico's

107.

Puerto Rican Governor-Elect Trusts Trump Will Back Change in Island'sStatus, Fox NEWS

LATINO (Nov. 9, 2016), http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2016/11/09/puerto-rican-governorelect-trusts-trump-will-back-change-in-island-status/print.
108. Silva, supra note 17; see also Jorge Bonilla, A ConservativeCasefor PuertoRico Statehood,
Fox NEWS (Aug. 10, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2017/08/10/conservative-case-for-puertorico-statehood.html.
109. Robles, supranote 6.
110. Of the four cases Jamal Greene lists as constituting the "anticanon" of constitutional law,
three fit this description: Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896), and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Jamal Greene, The Anticanon,
125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011). The fourth case is Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
111. Despite their ugly history, the cases do get cited by lawyers (including the Obama
Administration's Justice Department) and judges. See Pema Levy, Obama Administration Using CenturyOld Racist Case Law to Block Citizenship, MOTHER JONES (Feb.
23, 2015),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/02/obama-birthright-citizenship-racist-american-samoatuaua (quoting Sanford Levinson as saying: "A lot of people are justifiably embarrassed by the Insular
Cases because they really do capture an earlier imperial moment that is saturated in white supremacy.").
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disadvantaged status. In Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, the Court held that Puerto
Rico, unlike a state, is not a "sovereign" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment's
Double Jeopardy Clause, which permits successive prosecutions by separate
sovereigns.11 2 Writing for a six-Justice majority, Justice Elena Kagan found that
the events of 1950-52 created a "new political entity," which was "republican in
form," and "subordinate to the sovereignty of the people of Puerto Rico."113 But
rather than creating a new sovereign, Congress's enactment of Public Law 600the organic law for the government of Puerto Rico- reflected Congress's "broad
latitude to develop innovative approaches to territorial governance." 1 14 And
because Congress authorized and approved Puerto Rico's Constitution, Congress
was "the deepest wellspring[]" of Puerto Rico's sovereignty." 5 Therefore,
Puerto Rico was not a "separate sovereign" from the United States, and
successive prosecutions would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause."16
Interestingly, the majority seemed to go out of its way to avoid directly citing the
Insular Cases.1 1 7

In dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer questioned whether this was the proper
inquiry and even whether it led to the conclusion that Justice Kagan had reached.
After all, states are only admitted to the United States on Congress's say-so but
are clearly treated as separate sovereigns for purposes of the Fifth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution.
Justice Breyer would have looked to "the broader context of Puerto Rico's
history" to determine whether the island had "gained sufficient sovereign
authority to become the 'source' of power behind its own criminal laws."] 18
Among the most important moments in that history, of course, were the passage
of Public Law 600 and the adoption of the Puerto Rico Constitution, whichalong with other evidence-Justice Breyer concluded were sufficient to show
separate sovereignty for purposes of double jeopardy analysis.119
The second case arose directly from Puerto Rico's debt crisis. In Puerto
Rico v. Franklin Calfornia Tax-Free Trust, the Supreme Court held that the
bankruptcy code provided no relief for Puerto Rico or its municipalities and yet
also precluded Puerto Rico from enacting an insolvency regime of its own. 12 0
Following the Court's decision, attempts to voluntarily restructure certain parts

112. 136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016). The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that
no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." However,
that prohibition does not apply if the prosecuting authorities are separate sovereigns-for example, the
federal government and a state. See Michael Dawson, Note, PopularSovereignty, Double Jeopardy, and
the DualSovereignty Doctrine, 102 YALE L.J. 281, 290-92 (1992).
113. Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1869 (2016) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
114. Id. at 1876.
115. Id. at 1871.
116. Id. at 1876.
117. Bartholomew Sparrow, The Precedent Vanishes: Puerto Rico v. Sanchez-Valle and the
Insular Cases 26 (Feb. 7, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
118. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1880 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 1884 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
120. 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016).
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of the debt, while showing initial glimmers of optimism, eventually fell apart.121
Puerto Rico was in fiscal purgatory.
Eventually, Congress generated something of a solution-one that,
whatever its effectiveness, emphasizes Puerto Rico's second-class status.
Specifically, Congress passed PROMESA, which provided a bankruptcy-type
option for Puerto Rico, but imposed a steep price. 12 2 A control board was put in
place with effective control over the territory's finances and conduct of any
bankruptcy-type proceedings.1 23 It remains to be seen whether this last-minute
action is sufficient to save the island from economic collapse, but in any event,
the loss of sovereignty is a price that no state would ever be asked to pay.
Finally, although not directly involving Puerto Rico as a party, the Court
denied certiorari in Tuaua v. UnitedStates. The parties in that case sought review
of a D.C. Circuit decision upholding a 1900 law providing that people born in
American Samoa are "nationals" who owe allegiance to the United States butunlike people born in any of the fifty states, or even in territories like Guam and
Puerto Rico itself-are not citizens. 12 4 This, the petitioners argued, violates the
Fourteenth Amendment's declaration that all persons "born or naturalized in the
United States" are U.S. citizens. 12 5 The Court declined to hear the case, but it
126
might have another chance-a similar case has already been filed.
Perhaps not since the Insular Cases have the constitutional implications of
colonialism been so central to the Supreme Court's docket-and the Justices
have essentially re-affirmed the status quo, one in which the people of territories
like Puerto Rico and Guam have second class status.1 27 But in other ways, things
have changed. A century later, it seems plausible that Puerto Ricans might favor
statehood at precisely the same time, and for the same reasons, that voters and
politicians on the mainland oppose it. Indeed, some of the rhetoric surrounding
the financial crisis indicates that many political leaders think of Puerto Rico as a
distant, ne'er do well relation, but not really part of the family.1 2 8

121. For details, see Gulati & Rasmussen, supra note 7, at 135.
122. For a detailed description of PROMESA, see D. ANDREW AUSTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R42765, THE PUERTO RIco OVERSIGHT, MANAGEMENT, AND ECONOMIC STABILITY ACT (PROMESA;

H.R. 5278, S. 2328) (2016).
123. Juan R. Torruella, Why Puerto Rico Does Not Need Further Experimentation With Its
Future: A Reply to the Notion of "TerritorialFederalism", 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 65, 93-97 (2018); Mary
Williams Walsh, Puerto Rico Debt Relief Law Stirs Colonial Resentment, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/01/business/dealbook/puerto-rico-debt-relief-law-stirs-colonialresentment.html ("[L]awmakers have said they had power to enact the Promesa under the Territorial
Clause of the United States Constitution, and that renewed the debate here about whether Puerto Rico
should be a state, a territory, a sovereign nation--or just what.").
124. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Tuaua v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2461 (2016) (No. 15981); Christina Duffy Ponsa, Opinion, Are American Samoans American?, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/08/opinion/are-american-samoans-american.html.
125. Tuauav. United States, 788 F.3d 300, 302-03 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2461
(2016).
126. See Sophia Yan, American Samoans Sue for Birthright Citizenship, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/5a3daf6dlaac4f89b26afad3cdf007b4.
127. See, e.g., Andres G. Berdecia, PuertoRico Before the Supreme Court of the United States:
ConstitutionalColonialism in Action, 7 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 80, 149 (2016); Feldman, supra note 8.
128. For discussions along these lines, see, for example, Cate Long, Puerto Rico is America's
Greece, REUTERS MUNILAND BLOG (Mar. 8, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/muniland/2012/03/08/
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It is not our purpose here to further criticize the Insular Cases; indeed, it is
not clear anyone is left to defend them. 12 9 Judge Juan Torruella writes: "The
Insular Cases were flawed when decided because they (i) directly clashed with
our Constitution, (ii) were disobedient to controlling constitutional jurisprudence
in place at the time, and (iii) contravened, without exception, every single
historical precedent and practice of territorial expansion since our beginning as
a nation."l 30 Yet the cases remain good law, giving Congress near-limitless
power over Puerto Rico.1 3 1 Our interest lies with one particular aspect of that
power: the power to deny statehood or even to expel the island altogether.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF EXPULSION AND ACCESSION

The expulsion of a colony for financial reasons may seem far-fetched, but
historical illustrations are not hard to find. Newfoundland in the 1930s and 1940s
provides a ready example. By then, it was the British Empire's oldest colony,
and had the status of a "self-governing dominion."1 3 2 But due to a combination
of fiscal mismanagement and a drop in global fish prices in the 1930s,
Newfoundland found itself with an unsustainable debt stock.133 Attempts were
made to bring the situation under control-an imperial commission took control
of governance for a period-but matters did not improve enough, nor did World
War II help to ameliorate the situation.1 34 By 1946, faced with the prospect of
having to invest in Newfoundland to get the dominion on its feet, the British
mainland decided that it would be better to give the territory to Canada, which
agreed to take on ninety percent of the debt. 13 5 The end result: Newfoundland
essentially got expelled by the British Empire and was transferred to the
puerto-rico-is-americas-greece; and PuertoRico: Greece in the Caribbean,ECONOMIST (Oct. 26, 2013),
https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21588374-stuck-real-debt-crisis-its-back-yard-america-canlearn-europes-aegean. See also Gervasio Luis Garcia, I Am the Other: Puerto Rico in the Eyes of North
Americans, 1898, 87 J. AM. HIST. 39,44 (2000) (noting that classifying Puerto Rico as an unincorporated
territory meant "relegating the island to the perpetual status of a ward who will never become part of his
patron's family").
129. Cf Duffy Burnett & Marshall, supra note 13, at 2 ("No one today defends the colonial status
sanctioned by these cases, yet the idea of a relationship to the United States that is somewhere 'in between'
that of statehood and independence . .. has not only survived but enjoys substantial support."). One can,
of course, imagine how the subordination of territories to military bases could be useful for various public
and private interests, including but not limited to those involving national defense. David Vine, Most
Countries Have Given Up Their Colonies. Why Hasn't America?, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2017/09/28/most-countries-have-given-uptheir-colonies-why-hasnt-america ("Why, in 2017, decades after the civil rights and decolonization eras,
does the United States still have colonies and citizens who lack full democratic rights by law? The answer
is largely simple, but troubling: Because the desires and power of the United States military have
overwhelmed the desires and rights of colonized peoples.").
130. Torruella, supra note 8, at 62.
131. But see Consejo de Salud Playa de Ponce v. Rullan, 586 F. Supp. 2d 22 (D.P.R. 2008)
(suggesting that Puerto Rico may have transitioned over the time since the Insular Cases were decided
from an unincorporated to an incorporated territory).
132. David Hale, The Newfoundland Lesson, INT'L ECON., Summer 2003, at 52-53.
133. Id. at 53 (noting that in 1933, Newfoundland had roughly one hundred million dollars in
debt, with an annual nominal income of only around thirty million dollars); see also CARMEN REINHART
& KENNETH ROGOFF, THIS TIME iS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY (2013)

(describing Newfoundland's change in sovereign status resulting from its debt crisis in the 1930s).
134. Hale, supranote 132, at 53-59.
135. Id. at 60.
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Canadian federation, with little or no say from the Newfoundlanders.
Finding guidance in international law is complicated as a threshold matter,
precisely because Puerto Rico's current status is, as a matter of international law,
debatable. If the compact between Puerto Rico and the rest of the United States
is akin to a treaty between separate sovereigns, one set of international rules
applies. If Puerto Rico is "part of' the United States, a separate set applies. We
analyze each in turn, recognizing that these are not the only options and that the
island's current status probably lies somewhere in between. The answers are not
straightforward, but they suggest that the mainland does not have the exclusive
and final word on Puerto Rico's future.
A.

IfPuerto Rico is a Separate Sovereign

Discussions of Puerto Rico's status sometimes proceed as if Puerto Rico is
already something like a separate sovereign. U.S. courts, including the Supreme
Court, often describe Puerto Rico as being "sovereign" in matters not governed
by the U.S. Constitution 36-a somewhat ambiguous account. The United
Nations' Special Committee on Decolonization has gone farther, adopting a
resolution criticizing violations of the island's "national rights."' 37
The most significant textual evidence for this view is the phrase "in the
nature of a compact," which appears in Public Law 600. Supporters of the
"compact theory" have long trumpeted this language as indicating that Puerto
Rico and the rest of the United States entered into the agreement as something
like equals or co-sovereigns. 138 In a message to Congress regarding the Puerto
Rican draft constitution, President Harry S. Truman emphasized the novelty of
the post-1950s relationship:
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico will be a government which is truly by the
consent of the governed. No government can be invested with a higher dignity and
greater worth than one based upon the principle of consent. The people of the United
States and the people of Puerto Rico are entering into a new relationship that will
serve as an inspiration to all who love freedom and hate tyranny.1 39

This articulation of a relationship of shared governance between sovereigns
seems to be what convinced the U.N. General Assembly to adopt a resolution in
136. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986); Rodriguez v. Popular
Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1 (1982).
137. U.N. GAOR, 33rd Sess., 1133d mtg. at 32, U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/574 (Sept. 12, 1978).
138. See infra note 176 and sources cited therein. It is possible to see some elements of this theory
in existing First Circuit jurisprudence, at least before Sanchez Valle. See, e.g., United States v. Quinones,
758 F.2d 40, 42 (1st Cir. 1985) (stating that "in 1952, Puerto Rico ceased being a territory of the United
States subject to the plenary powers of Congress"); accord Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457
U.S. 1, 8 (1982) ("Puerto Rico, like a state, is an autonomous political entity, 'sovereign over matters not
ruled by the Constitution."' (citations omitted)); United States v. Lopez-Andino, 831 F.2d 1164, 1968 (1st
Cir. 1987) (finding Puerto Rico's status like that of a state and finding Puerto Rico and the United States
separate sovereigns for double jeopardy purposes); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of P.R. v. Ruiz De Jesus,
644 F.2d 910, 911 (1st Cir. 1981) ("Puerto Rico's territorial status ended, of course, in 1952."). There is
a contrary view, which is that history shows that Public Law 600 and its language about a "compact" is,
and has long been, eyewash. See Torruella, supra note 123, at 85-88, 96 (describing the compact as a
"monumental hoax" perpetrated on the United Nations).
139. President Harry S. Truman, Special Message to the Congress Transmitting the Constitution
of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Apr. 22, 1952), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14089.
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November 1953 recognizing that, under the compact, "the people of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have been vested with attributes of political
sovereignty which clearly identify the status of self-government attained by the
Puerto Rican people as an autonomous political entity."l40 Some commentators
go further, arguing that the nature of the "compact" indicates permanence-that
because it is essentially a treaty, it can only be changed by the consent of both
Puerto Rico and the rest of the United States. 14 1
As a matter of international law, however, this is not necessarily true.
Treaties often make explicit provision for withdrawal or expulsion (which, in the
case of a bilateral treaty, are nearly equivalent). 14 2 To take one prominent
example, Article 6 of the U.N. Charter provides that "[a] member of the United
Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present
Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon
the recommendation of the Security Council." 43 Similarly, the Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund provide for a similar outcome of
compulsory withdrawal: "If a member fails to fulfill any of its obligations under
this Agreement, the Fund may declare the member ineligible to use the general
resources of the Fund." 14 4
The ability to effectively expel a state that has materially breached an
international law obligation was codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties. Under Article 60 of the Vienna Convention, a "material breach" of
a multilateral treaty by one party entitles "the other parties by unanimous
agreement to suspend the operation of the treaty in whole or in part or to
terminate it either: (i) in the relations between themselves and the defaulting
State, or (ii) as between all the parties."1 4 5
Even where those explicit provisions are absent, the best reading of
background principles of international law suggests that there is an implicit right

140. OOSTINDIE & KLINKERS, supranote 20, at 47 (footnote omitted).
141.

Jason A. Otano, Puerto Rico Pandemonium: The Commonwealth Constitution and the

Compact-Colony Conundrum, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1806, 1810 (2004) ("To some, Puerto Rico has
created a unique relationship with the United States, bound by a compact, which cannot be denounced by
either party unless it has the permission of the other party .... ); cf Quinones, 758 F.2d at 42 ("Under
the compact between the people of Puerto Rico and the United States, Congress cannot amend the Puerto
Rico Constitution unilaterally . . . ."). But see United States v. Sanchez, 992 F.2d 1143, 1151 (11th Cir.
1993) ("Puerto Rico is still constitutionally a territory, and not a separate sovereign.").
142. See generallyLaurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REv. 1579 (2005).
143. U.N. Charter art. 6.
144. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund art. 26, § 2(a), Dec. 27, 1945, 60
Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39.
145. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 60(2)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
Magliveras notes that if an international organization's "constitutive instrument contains suspension or
expulsion clauses, the organization has been delegated the power to proceed accordingly; if not, Article
60 of the Vienna Convention could be applied." KONSTANTINOS D. MAGLIVERAS, EXCLUSION FROM
PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE BEHIND MEMBER
STATES' EXPULSION AND SUSPENSION OF MEMBERSHIP 232-33 (1999); see also id. at 3 ("Since it is the

minority of constitutive instruments which contain express suspension and/or expulsion clauses, this
lacuna is addressed by arguing that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the rules on
permitted countermeasures could be invoked and applied by analogy in appropriate cases."); Chi
Carmody, On Expelling Nigeriafrom the Commonwealth, 34 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 273, 284 (1996) ("The
Vienna Convention has never been invoked to resolve a disputed expulsion, but a number of the
convention's articles apply to such a situation.").
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of expulsion if one party persistently breaches material terms of the
agreement. 14 6 Outright expulsion from international organizations is rare but not
unheard of. The Soviet Union was effectively expelled from the League of
Nations in 1939 after it invaded Finland; 14 7 Czechoslovakia was expelled from
the International Monetary Fund in 1954 for refusing to provide data. 148 And, as
one might expect, the threat of expulsion is sometimes invoked to get members
to behave. 14 9
Recently, the question of expulsion has gained salience in the context of
the Greek debt crisis. Frustrated by Greece's inability to meet its obligations, and
the fact that it apparently earned admission to the European Monetary Union on
the basis of misleading numbers, some commentators have raised the possibility
of expelling Greece from the Eurozone.so Others have responded that this is
impossible, because the treaties do not make specific provision for such an
eventuality. 15 1 But, as noted, such an explicit power is unnecessary. 152 That does
not mean that Greece should be expelled. What it does mean, however, is that
one cannot categorically avoid the question.
Assuming that Puerto Rico is, like Greece, a separate sovereign, the
situation is analogous. The precipitating event.for contemplating expulsion is, in
both cases, incipient bankruptcy and a massive debt crisis. But, as with Greece,
this is not an argument in favor of expelling Puerto Rico. Expulsion on the basis
of material breach generally presupposes some degree offault.15 3 In the case of
Greece, the alleged breaches were specific and severe: providing misleading
numbers so as to ensure admittance to the monetary union in the first place,
failing to comply with rules regarding fiscal austerity, and more. 154 Nothing like
that has happened in the case of Puerto Rico. To the contrary, as the Supreme
146. See Blocher, Gulati & Helfer, supra note 39, at 144.
147. MAGLIVERAS, supra note 145, at 22.
148. Blocher, Gulati & Helfer, supra note 39, at 134.
149. See id. at 131-34.
150. See, e.g., Jochen Bittner, It's Time for Greece to Leave the Euro, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/08/opinion/jochen-bittner-its-time-for-greece-to-leave-the-euro.html;
Leo Cendrowicz, Greek Debt Crisis:Alexis Tsipras Given Ultimatum-PushThrough Cuts This Week Or
Quit Euro, INDEPENDENT (July 12, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/greek-debtcrisis-alexis-tsipras-given-ultimatum-push-through-cuts-this-week-or-quit-euro-10384084.html
(reporting the threat made to Greece that it either take on more austerity in July 2015 or take a "time out"
from the Euro); Dalia Fahmy & Elisabeth Behrmann, Germans Tired of Greek Demands Want Country
to Exit Euro, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 15, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-0315/germans-tired-of-greek-demands-want-country-to-exit-euro (reporting that fifty-two percent of
Germans polled wanted Greece to exit the Euro, with eighty percent of Germans polled taking the view
that Greece "isn't behaving seriously towards its European partners"); Germans CallForGreece to Leave
the Euro, After "No " Referendum Vote, FORTUNE (July 5, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/07/05/germanscall-for-greece-to-leave-the-euro-zone-after-no-referendum-vote.
151. Phoebus Athanassiou, Withdrawal andExpulsionfrom the EU and EMU: Some Reflections
35 (Eur. Cent. Bank Legal Working Paper Series No. 10, 2009); Annie Lowrey, Could Greece Get Kicked
Out of the European Union? No, FP EXPLAINER (Mar. 23, 2010), http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/03/23/
could-greece-get-kicked-out-of-the-european-union.
152. See Blocher, Gulati & Helfer, supra note' 39.
153. Louis B. Sohn, Expulsion or Forced Withdrawalfrom an InternationalOrganization, 77
HARV. L. REv. 1381, 1400 (1964).
154. On the falsification of data to join the EU, see Anthee Carassava, Greece Admits to Faking
Data to Join Europe, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/23/world/
europe/greece-admits-faking-data-to-join-europe.htm. More generally, see Dammann, supra note 39.
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Court's decision last year made clear, Puerto Rico has been denied the options
to tackle its own domestic debt crisis that state governments in the United States
have long been allowed. There seems to be no logical reason for this
discrimination,155 though its effect is again to highlight Puerto Rico's
disadvantaged relationship with the mainland.
B.

IfPuerto Rico is "PartOf' the United States

The second way to see Puerto Rico is not as a separate "sovereign" akin to
a foreign treaty partner, but as a part of the tighter compact that constitutes the
United States. After all, Senate and House Reports both stated that Public Law
600 "would not change Puerto Rico's fundamental political, social, and
economic relationship to the United States."1 5 6 If that is the case, then the
relevant question for international law is whether a nation can excise a part of
itself.
Traditionally, this has not been a prominent question.157 Though
international law has long been preoccupied with borders, it has generally
assumed that the pressures that must be managed are either expansionist or
secessionist.' 5 8 This has led to the emergence of two foundational but sharply
divergent principles, the reconciliation of which presents a considerable
challenge.
On the one hand, the traditional rules of sovereignty give States control
over their own borders so long as they do not interfere with the borders of other
nations. This means that nations can cede-and often have ceded-territory to
others without the approval of the territory's residents. Most of the United States,
including Puerto Rico, was acquired in such a fashion. 5 9
On the other hand, particularly in the past century, law and practice have
given increased attention to the rights and interests of "peoples" to determine
their own political destinies. The ascendant principle of self-determination
provides that, in certain circumstances, a sub-national group or region can choose
to secede, so as to become independent, or perhaps join another nation. The
circumstances under which this right can be invoked remain a subject of debate,
but nearly everyone agrees that former colonies are the paradigm example. 160
The possibility of expelling sovereign territory, especially colonies like
Puerto Rico, confounds these rules in both directions. The traditional rules of
sovereignty would say that the United States has a nearly unfettered power to
decide for itself whether to maintain Puerto Rico as a territory, subject merely to

155. Gulati & Rasmussen, supra note 7.
156. S. REP. No. 81-1779, at 3 (1950); H.R. REP. No. 81-2275, at 3 (1950).
157. Blocher & Gulati, supra note 22, at 217.
158. Id.
159. Blocher, supra note 24, at 245-46 ("The United States as we know it was shaped by land
sales: the Louisiana Purchase, Alaska Purchase, and Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo together account for
more than half of the nation's landmass, and they are not the only territory whose sovereign control has
been bought and sold.").
160. Karen Knop, A Marketfor Sovereignty? The Roles of Other States in Self-Determination,
54 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 491 (2017).
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its own domestic restrictions.'61
But it is implausible to think that this traditional rule from the days of
imperial power and conquest holds force today. International law no longer gives
countries unfettered authority to alter their borders-or even to cede territory
voluntarily to another nation. If the right to self-determination has any force, it
cannot be the case that nations can buy, sell, and abandon inhabited territory
without some showing of consent from that territory's residents. If those are the
contours of the general rule, then what is the specific rule that would apply in the

case of Puerto Rico?
Two characteristics of Puerto Rico's situation are particularly notable.
First, it is a former colony. Second, it transitioned from colonial status to selfgovernance status at the very time when the international order was shifting from
an acceptance of imperial subjugation to a rejection of that principle in favor of
the right to self-govemance.
Take the general international law rules for colonies. Traditionally,
international law scholars tend to think of the colonial right to self-determination
as going only in one direction.1 62 In the case of former colonies, that has typically
meant exit from the colonial State in favor of independence-and independence
was evidently the preferred outcome for the former colonies that achieved
independence in the decades after World War II.
But if the former oppressor is a rich State, with valuable citizenship rights,
it is not clear that the people of the colony would prefer independenceparticularly now that international law and global norms prohibit the kind of
discrimination that in earlier decades would have made formal citizenship less
valuable in practice. And this, as we have seen through multiple votes over the
past few decades, is the situation in Puerto Rico. (Alex Aleinikoff has described
Puerto Rico's status as "colonialism by consent.")1 6 3 On the flip side of the
equation, the preferences of the former colonial powers might also be different,
now that the former colonial subjects have to be treated as equals; granting them
"independence" begins to look more attractive. Effectively, there are pressures

161. Independent doctrines of international law would prevent particular kinds of expulsion, such
as one that would subject the residents of the expelled territory to persecution. See United Nations
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33, openedfor signature July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
150 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) ("No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee
in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.").
162. This assumption is implicit in the treatment of self-determination as a deprivation of
sovereign control. See, e.g., A. RIGO-SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION:

A STUDY OF UNITED NATIONS PRACTICE 353 (1973) ("[W]ithin the context of colonialism, selfdetermination has become a peremptory norm of International Law whereby a state's title to a territory
having colonial status is void.").
163. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Puerto Rico and the Constitution: Conundrums and Prospects, 11
CONST. COMMENT 15, 33 (1994); OOSTINDIE & KLINKERS, supra note 20, at 55 (noting that, on the U.S.

Virgin Islands, "[iun spite of U.N. criticism, constitutional matters seem of little importance either to the
local population or to the United States," and that in a 1993 status referendum, 80.4 percent of voters
voted for continued or enhanced territorial status with the United States); id. at 55-56 ("The explanation
for the populations' [of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands] relative contentment with subordination
to the United States lies in the inherent and substantial economic support and political stability they enjoy,
as well as in the possession of American citizenship and the right of abode in the metropolis.").
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favoring a perverse kind of self-determination--de-colonization upside down, 164
whereby colonies are made independent against their wishes.
We think that international law, prohibits expulsion, for almost exactly the
same reasons that it gives Puerto Rico a right to independence. Put differently,
the right to self-determination of a former colony should negate the former
colonizer's power to expel it. If the colonizing power wants to be rid of its
colonies, it should effectively have to buy them out. Otherwise, only the
colonizer has a meaningful right to "self-determination," a right whose exercise
will only further disadvantage the residents of its colonies. The logic of the rule
points in precisely the opposite direction: giving former colonies like Puerto Rico
the right to decide their alignment with the metropole, perhaps even by
demanding statehood. Whatever the rules might be regarding expulsion of
territories or members who voluntarily joined, the rules should favor coerced
parties like Puerto Rico.
To say that Puerto Rico has the right to choose its status, however, is not
the same as saying that it can choose whatever it wants.' 65 International law
provides a dizzying range of possibilities. Even within the context of the United
States, the details of territorial governance are quite complex.166 Our primary
focus here is not on what choices are available, although we have our doubts that
"unincorporated territory" is one of them. Rather, we focus on who gets to make
the decision-and we believe Puerto Rico has greater rights under international
law than many assume.
C.

The Domestic Relevance ofInternationalPrinciples

At first cut, international law may seem irrelevant to, or at least not
dispositive of, the domestic legal question of whether Puerto Rico can be
expelled from the United States. And indeed, the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit, which has jurisdiction over Puerto Rico, has effectively said
as much in the course of rejecting the claim that U.S. human rights treaty
obligations mandate federal voting rights for the inhabitants of Puerto Rico.1 67
There is a different way to come at the issue, though, which is to ask
whether some source of domestic law, perhaps influenced by international law,
gives Puerto Rican citizens rights vis-A-vis the mainland.1 6 8 In such a context,
international law would not be countermanding domestic law, but rather helping
164. OOSTINDIE & KLINKERS, supranote 20, at 217 ("As far as Westminster was concerned, all
of the former British colonies had to go. The fact that at present a handful of Caribbean 'Overseas
Territories' still come under the sovereignty of the United Kingdom should not, therefore, be attributed to
the ardent wishes of Westminster, but rather to the stubbornness with which these islands have refused to
accept independence.").
165. See Blocher & Gulati, supra note 22.
166.

See generallyARNOLD H. LEIBOwITz, DEFINING STATUS: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF

UNITED STATES TERRITORIAL RELATIONS (1989) (describing the varying forms of federal control over
American territories, from possessions like Guam to the largely self-governing Northern Marianas).
167. See Igartia v. United States 626 F.3d 592 (1st Cir. 2010); Igartua-De La Rosa v. United
States, 417 F.3d 145, 147 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc).
168. See Igartza, 626 F.3d. at 609 (Lipez, J., concurring) ("If Puerto Rico residents' right to vote
originates from a source of United States law other than the Constitution, however, it is possible that
declaratory relief could properly involve individual government officials rather than Congress.").
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to determine the terms of an already existing domestic agreement. There is no
dispute that such an agreement exists: Public Law 600 was explicitly represented
to be a "compact" that would govern the future relationship between the United
States and Puerto Rico. Given that the agreement has no explicit terms about
expulsion, a court would have to put in place a default provision.
As a legal matter, the move to commonwealth status was set in motion by
the passage of Public Law 600, "an Act to provide for the organization of a
constitutional government by the people of Puerto Rico," 169 which provided for
an insular referendum that in turn overwhelmingly approved the creation of a
constitutional convention. 17 0 The draft constitution was ratified by a public
referendum in March 1952 and by Congress soon after. The statehood movement
regained steam at around the same time.' 7 1 In the course of approving the Puerto
Rico Constitution, House Majority Leader John McCormack said that Public
Law 600 was "a new experiment; it is turning away from the territorial status; it
is something intermediary between the territorial status and statehood."1 72
A quarter century later, Puerto Rican senator, law professor, and
independence party leader Rubdn Berrios Martinez summarized the compact and
its aftermath:
Twenty-five years ago the establishment of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico was
the official U.S. response to the worldwide process of decolonization. It was the
"showcase of democracy" for colonial peoples and underdeveloped countries, the
U.S. model of how a country could pull itself out of poverty "by its own bootstraps"
through an intimate political and economic relationship with the United States ....
By 1977, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has become a source of embarrassment

to the United States.1

73

By that time, the relationship was not only a source of embarrassment for the
United States, but also one of aggravation for the island.1 74
Scholars and commentators have long been divided over what to make of
Public Law 600, in particular the fact that it describes itself as being "in the
nature of a compact."1 75 Many claim this phrase as evidence that the United
States and Puerto Rico are something like separate sovereigns, and that Puerto
169. Act of July 3, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-600, 64 Stat. 319 (codified at 48 U.S.C. §§ 731b-731e
(2006)).
170. Adriel I. Cepeda Derieux, A Most Insular Minority: ReconsideringJudicial Deference to
Unequal Treatment in Light of PuertoRico's PoliticalProcess Failure, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 797, 811

n.81 (2010).
171. CABRANES, supranote 25, at 11 n.28 (noting between 1952 and 1976 "a significant growth
in the statehood movement, at the expense of those parties favoring independence or continued
commonwealth status").
172. 98 CONG. REC. 5128 (1952).
173. Rubdn Berrios Martinez, Independencefor Puerto Rico: The Only Solution, 55 FOREIGN
AFF. 561 (1977).

174. CABRANES, supra note 25, at 8 (noting that in 1978 "the leaders of all major Puerto Rican
political parties for the first time appeared before the United Nations' Special Committee on
Decolonization, which thereafter adopted a resolution critical of alleged United States violations of the
Puerto Ricans' 'national rights."').
175. Act of July 3, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-600, 64 Stat. 319 ("Be it enacted by the Senate and
House of Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled, [t]hat, fully recognized the principle
of government by consent, this Act is now adopted in the nature of a compact so that the people of Puerto
Rico may organize a government pursuant to a constitution of their own adoption.").
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Rico's colonial status has been rescinded-a view that points in the direction of
the analysis in the previous Section.1 7 6
Perhaps the best evidence in favor of this view is the representation that the
United States itself made to the United Nations at the time. Article 73 of the U.N.
Charter requires nations to make regular reports about their non-self-goveming
areas (i.e., their colonies). Following the passage of Public Law 600, however,
the United States told the United Nations that such reports would no longer be
necessary, since the island was now sovereign. 17 7 The United States noted that
Public Law 600 "expressly recognized the principle of government by consent,"
and was "adopted in the nature of a compact."1 7 8 The U.N. accepted the
representation.
Others conclude, often to their own dismay, that Public Law 600 is
effectively nothing more than a statute-one that Congress could repeal without
Puerto Rico's consent. 17 9 One possible implication is that Congress could not
give away the federal government's territorial power even if it wanted to, short
of granting the island independence, statehood, or otherwise moving it into a
different constitutional category.
One way to understand this is through the lens of contract theory. It might
be argued that the terms of the compact have indeed been specified for all cases
in which there are no explicit terms (questions involving or demands of
statehood, for example), and that the specification is that Congress gets to decide
on all such matters.
Such a scenario is not particularly unusual. Parties often bargain to grant
one side discretion in decision-making. 80 That is the essence of most employeremployee relationships, for example: the employer has bargained to be able to
tell the employee what tasks to do. But this is still a bargain; one that is supposed
to benefit both parties. And implicit in the bargain is that one party will not use
its authority to act in ways that expropriate from or unilaterally harm the other.' 8 1
176. See, e.g., Keitner, supra note 31, at 77; Gary Lawson & Robert D. Sloane, The
Constitutionalityof Decolonization by Associated Statehood: PuertoRico's Legal Status Reconsidered,

50 B.C. L. Rev. 1123, 1126 (2009); see also H. Leibowitz, The Applicability of Federal Law to the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 56 GEO. L. REV. 219 (1967); Calvert Magruder, The Commonwealth
Status of Puerto Rico, 15 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1953); David A. Rezvani, The Basis of Puerto Rico's
ConstitutionalStatus: Colony, Compact, or "Federacy"?, 122 POL. SCI. Q. 115, 123 (2007); Dorian A.
Shaw, The Status of Puerto Rico Revisited: Does the Current U.S.-Puerto Rico Relationship Uphold
InternationalLaw?, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1006, 1031 (1994).
177. See generally Letter from Alejandro J. Garcia-Padilla, Governor of Puerto Rico, to His
Excellency Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations (Dec. 26, 2015),
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/PRico-governor-letter-to-UN-12-26-15.pdf
178. Memorandum by the Government of the United States ofAmerica concerning the Cessation
of Transmission of Information under Article 73(e) of the Charter with Regard to the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, reprinted in PUERTO RICO FEDERAL AFFAIRS ADMINISTRATION, DOCUMENTS ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIP OF PUERTO RICO AND THE UNITED STATES 618 (3d ed. 1988).
179. See, e.g., JUAN R. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO RICO: THE DOCTRINE

OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 144-200 (1985); Jon M. Van Dyke, The Evolving Legal Relationships
Between the United States and Its Affiliated U.S.-FlagIslands, 14 U. HAw. L. REV. 445, 459 (1992).
180. For an articulation of this insight, see Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and
Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and LateralIntegration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); and
Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete ContractsApproach to FinancialContracting,59 REV.
ECON. STUD. 473 (1992).

181. E.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Charles Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of
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In other words, what we describe is a distinction between one party being
the property of the other, and the existence of a contract between the two parties.
We use this distinction intentionally because when the question of Puerto Rico's
relationship with the rest of the United States came up in the early 1900s, the
Supreme Court ruled that constitutional rights did not necessarily extend to
Puerto Rico, even though it was part of the United States. And the reason for
creating an exception for the rights granted by the Constitution was that Puerto
Rico was different from the states; it was not a voluntary entrant into the Union,
but rather was the property of the rest of the United States. In 1952, though, as
part of the new world order where colonies and imperial subjugation were
supposed to be things of the past, the United States represented to the rest of the
world (and to Puerto Rico) that the relationship was changing. Puerto Rico was
now going to be part of the compact, with full rights of self-governance. The
days of colonial oppression were supposedly over.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF STATEHOOD AND EXPULSION

.

When in the course ofhuman events, it becomes necessaryfor onedeople to dissolve
the political bonds which have connected them with another

The U.S. Constitution was forged in the wake of a secession and, decades
later, secession was its greatest test. The Revolutionary War resulted in an
involuntary transfer of sovereign territory away from England; the later Civil
War was an attempt to do the same to the United States itself. In both cases, the
force for change came from the periphery and was opposed from the center.
But what if it were otherwise? What if England had decided to quit its
fractious and expensive American colonies, against the colonists' wishes?
Practically speaking, the outcome surely would have been similar-American
"independence"-although the process would have differed, and likely would
not have involved war. (It is hard to imagine the colonists taking up arms and
sailing to England to force the crown to keep them.)
Or consider the situation if Abraham Lincoln had not been elected
president in 1860. If, say, the Democratic Party had not been so riven by
disagreement about slavery, and Stephen Douglas had won the Party's undivided
loyalty, his support for "popular sovereignty" with regard to slavery (by which
newly admitted territories would decide for themselves whether to permit
slavery) might have become further entrenched, altering not only the shape of
the slavery debate but of the nation. If the people are sovereign, why should they
be ruled by borders? What if the North had decided that it was better to expel the
South, or at least let it go, rather than sacrifice more than half a million lives to
keep it?
One answer is to deny that the U.S. Constitution has anything to say about

Formal andInformal Contractingin Theory, Practiceand Doctrine, 110 COLUm. L. REv. 1377, 1416-17
(2010) (discussing how courts can and do step in to fill incompleteness at the margins of otherwise vague
collaborative contracts-where one side is abusing the other's trust, in the context of a collaborative
relationship).
182. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
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such matters-politics alone will be the final tribunal. And on some level, it is
correct that the political branches would play the leading role. Courts, after all,
were not the main players in the debate over the constitutionality of the South's
attempted secession.
But the limited role of courts does not mean that the questions are not
constitutional, only that the judicial branch does not have final say. In Luther v.
Borden-the case that effectively established the political question doctrinethe Supreme Court held that the "Republican Form of Government" Clause of
Article IV must be enforced by the President and Congress. 18 3 The Court has said
roughly the same thing about sovereign authority over the territories. 18 4 But these
are simply holdings about which branches have responsibility for interpretation
and enforcement, not whether the underlying rules are constitutional. In any
event, the Court actually has weighed in on the legality of secession. In the postCivil War case of Texas v. White, for example, the Court held that Texas had
never left the United States, that the Constitution did not permit secession, and
that the ordinances of secession and all legislative acts based on them were
"absolutely null."185
Consider, likewise, the Supreme Court of Canada's opinion on the legality
of Quebec's attempted secession.186 The Court rejected the notion that Quebec
had a right to unilateral secession under Canadian law but identified
circumstances under which such secessions would be permissible. 187 Crucially,
it did so as a legal matter, and in a way that the parties ultimately respected.
In short, we think that the U.S. Constitution can speak to the legality of
expulsion, and that its rules matter. 188 What, then, are those rules? The text of
the Constitution gives Congress enormous power in this area. Article IV, Section
3 says that "[n]ew States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union."'89
The word "may" arguably suggests that Congress could choose not to admit new
states, and the only limits that the text directly mentionsl90 are irrelevant to the
admission of Puerto Rico. Moreover, the same provisions give Congress the

183. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849).
184. Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890) ("Who is the sovereign, dejureor defacto,
of a territory, is not a judicial, but a political, question, the determination of which by the legislative and
executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers,
citizens, and subjects of that government. This principle has always been upheld by this court, and has
been affirmed under a great variety of circumstances.").
185. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 701 (1868), overturned in part by Morgan v. United States,
113 U.S. 476 (1885)
186. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.).
187. Id. 138; see id. % 128-35.
188. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discoveringthe Constitution,93 YALE L.J.
1013, 1051-52 (1984); Paul Finkelman, Opinion, How the Civil War Changed the Constitution, N.Y.
TIMs (June 2, 2015), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/06/02/how-the-civil-war-changed-theconstitution; cf Duffy Burnett & Marshall, supranote 13, at 19 ("This disagreement [over Puerto Rico's
status] is not merely 'political': differing views about what is constitutionally possible shape the different
views about what is desirable.").
189. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (emphasis added).
190. Id. ("New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new States shall
be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction
of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned
as well as of the Congress.").
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"Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States"-this is the
Territories Clause (or Territorial Clause) and has been read in the Insular Cases
and elsewhere to give Congress near-plenary authority over the territories.
But even broad congressional powers-the commerce power, to take one
example-are subject to constitutional restrictions, and the same would be true
of particular types, methods, or motivations for expulsion. Expulsion motivated
by racial animus and inflicting harm on Puerto Ricans would trigger-and
perhaps fail-Equal Protection analysis, to take one obvious example. 1 9 1
Those constraints excepted, the Constitution surely does preserve broad
political discretion in managing the territories. Consider the following from Felix
Frankfurter, then a clerk in the Bureau of Insular Affairs at the War Department:
The form of the relationship between the United States and the unincorporated
territory is solely a problem of statesmanship.... History suggests a great diversity
of relationships between a central government and dependent territory. The present
day shows a great variety in actual operation. One of the great demands upon
inventive statesmanship is to help evolve new kinds of relationship[s] so as to
combine the advantages of local self-government with those of a confederated union.
192
Luckily, our Constitution has left this field of invention open.

A similar line appeared in the HarvardLaw Review articles described above. In
one, future Harvard President Abbott Lawrence Lowell argued that it was up to
the political branches to determine whether a territory should be incorporated
into the United States, or merely acquired by it: "The incorporation of territory
in the Union, like the acquisition of territory at all, is a matter solely for the
legislative or treaty-making authorities." 93 Contemporary scholars continue to
invoke that basic framework to argue for a flexible approach to Puerto Rico's
status-specifically, to defend the desirability of options other than
independence and statehood. 1 94 As mentioned, our focus is less on what the
options are (though we are skeptical of the continuing vitality of the Insular
Cases), and more on who gets to choose among them. A range of options means
something very different when Congress, rather than the people of Puerto Rico,
gets to make the choice.
A.

Domestic Self-Determinationfor the Territories

The hardest scenario for our argument is one where Puerto Rico demands
statehood, seemingly against the wishes of Congress. In that case, the
191. The qualifier "perhaps" is necessary here because some precedent suggests that Congress

"may treat Puerto Rico differently from States so long as there is a rational basis for its actions." Romeu
v. Cohen, 265 F.3d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 n.4 (1978) (per curiam)
(upholding denial of Social Security benefits to U.S. citizens who relocated from Puerto Rico to the
mainland)). Even so, there is a constitutionally significant difference between giving Puerto Rico
dissimilar treatment because it is a territory and doing so because of racial animus.
192. Mora v. Torres, 113 F. Supp. 309, 319 (D.P.R. 1953) (quoting Frankfurter); see also Puerto
Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1876 (2016) (describing Puerto Rico's attainment of
commonwealth status as a "prime example" of Congress's "broad latitude to develop inventive approaches
to territorial governance").
193. Lowell, supra note 47, at 176.
194. See, e.g., Issacharoffet al., supra note 49.
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Constitution is not clearly in Puerto Rico's favor. But the matter is not entirely

clear cut.
As a historical matter, there is precedent for statehood-on-demandprecedent that supporters of Puerto Rican statehood have invoked.' 95 In 1796,
Tennessee became the sixteenth state, and the first to be carved out of federally
owned territory. (The thirteen colonies, Kentucky, and Vermont preceded it, but
none was ever a territory.) But the path to statehood was not simple. The land
that today constitutes Tennessee was originally granted to the federal
government by North Carolina,' 96 to be governed under the terms of the
Northwest Ordinance.' 97 As to statehood, Article V of the Ordinance stipulated
that "[t]here shall be formed in the said territory, not less than three nor more
than five states."198 And, upon reaching "sixty thousand free inhabitants therein,
such State shall be admitted by its delegates into the Congress of the United
States, on an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever." 99
However, admission of states with a population of less than sixty thousand would
be allowed if "consistent with the general interest of the confederacy." 200
Congress acquiesced to the conditions of North Carolina's legislature and
in 1790 passed a bill establishing the Southwest Territory. 20 1 The Territory
elected its first legislature in 1794,202 and, within the year, the legislature passed
a bill providing for a census and referendum regarding public opinion of
statehood.203 The census indicated that the Territory had a population of 77,262
persons, 2 04 and the results of the referendum showed "6,504 [votes] in favor of
205
statehood . . . and 2,562 against."
The census and referendum results prompted Tennessee's governor, Willie
Blount, to call for a convention to adopt a state constitution. 2 06 In February 1796,
the convention adopted a constitution proclaiming that the people of the Territory
"mutually agreed with each other to form themselves into a free and independent
State by the name of the State of Tennessee," and asserted they "ha[d] the right
of admission into the General Government [of the United States] as a member

195. Coto, supra note 13 (reporting that the new Governor of Puerto Rico "said he would soon
hold elections to choose two senators and five representatives to Congress and send them to Washington
to demand statehood, a strategy used by Tennessee to join the union in the 18th century").
196. See 1789 N.C. Sess. Law 4-6 (stipulating conditions for cession of land).
197. See Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 14, 1 Stat. 123 (establishing the governance structure for the
Southwest Territory); see also NORTHWEST ORDINANCE OF 1787, reprintedin I UNITED STATES CODE,

at LV (Office of the Law Revision Counsel of the House of Representatives ed., 2006).
198. Id. art. V.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 14, 1 Stat. 123.
202. PHILIP M. HAMER, TENNESSEE: A HISTORY, 1673-1932, at 163-64 (1933).
203. Id. at 165.
204. The 77,262 figure included 10,613 slaves, giving the Territory a population of 66,649 free
inhabitants. I STANLEY J. FOLMSBEE ET AL., HISTORY OF TENNESSEE 209 (1960).
205. Id.
206. Cf Charlotte Williams, CongressionalAction on the Admission ofTennessee into the Union,
2 TENN. HIST. Q. 291, 295 (1943) (linking the results of the census with Governor Blount's calls for a
constitutional convention).
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state thereof." 20 7 Following adoption of its constitution, Tennessee elected a new
governor and replaced its territorial assembly with a newly elected state
legislature.208 Stanley Folmsbee writes that following the adoption of
Tennessee's constitution, "government under the law creating the Southwest
Territory came rapidly to an end." 209
Opponents of immediate statehood argued that the terms of the Act of 1790
indicated an antecedent act of Congress was required to establish the borders of
states.2lo Furthermore, the Act did not authorize the territorial government to
undertake a census, 211 and the census conducted by the territorial government
overinflated the number of inhabitants. 2 12
Supporters of immediate admission argued that opponents were "spinning
a finer thread than was necessary." 213 Rather than ask whether Tennessee had
met all of the conditions required by the Act of 1790, the only appropriate
question was whether Tennessee should be admitted as a state. 2 14 Proponents
essentially argued in favor of the principle of self-determination: the people of
the Southwest Territory desired to be admitted to the Union as a state, and unless
admission worked to the general detriment of the Union, Congress should admit
Tennessee as a state.2 1 5 Furthermore, the people of the Southwest Territory "were
at present in a degraded situation; they were deprived of a right essential to
freemen-the right to be represented in Congress." 216 Should Congress admit
Tennessee to the Union, prior to having the requisite number of inhabitants, "it
was only a fugitive consideration." 217 Rather, "where there was doubt, Congress
ought to lean towards a decision which should give equal rights to every part of
the American people."2 18
After two days of debate, 2 19 the House passed a resolution recognizing that
the "Territory, now bearing the name of the State of Tennessee, was entitled to
all privileges enjoyed by the other States of the Union, and that it should be one
of the sixteen States of America." 220 In the Senate, political concerns
predominated. President George Washington had made public his decision not
to run for a third term, and Federalists-who controlled the Senate-were
worried that admission of Tennessee to the Union would tip the presidential
207. TENN. CONST. OF 1796, pmbl.
208. Id.
209. FOLMSBEE ET AL., supra note 204, at 214.
210. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 1301-02 (1796).

211. Id. at 1302.
212. The territorial census measured "people within the respective counties," whereas the Act of
1790 referred to "the inhabitants within the respective districts." Furthermore, sheriffs were paid "a dollar
for every 200 persons they returned," and the results of the census were "just sufficient" to entitle
Tennessee, should it be admitted as a state, to two members in the House of Representatives. Id. at 130203.
213.

Id at 1308.

214. Id at 1304.
215. Id at 1305.
216. Id. at 1309.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Williams, supranote 206206, at 307.
220. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 916 (1796).
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election in favor of Republican candidate Thomas Jefferson. 22 1 (One could easily
imagine a modem analog if Puerto Rico were to actively seek statehood.) To that
end, the Senate adopted a bill providing for the territory to be admitted as a single
state, but only following "a more satisfactory census ... taken under the authority
of Congress."222
The House refused to accept the terms of the Senate bill but instead
proposed a compromise whereby Tennessee would be immediately admitted to
the Union but would have only one Representative in the House-and
consequentially only three electoral votes-until the next federal census in
1800.223 The Senate accepted the compromise, and President Washington signed
a bill admitting Tennessee into the Union on June 1, 1796.224
Like Tennessee, Puerto Rico's existing relationship to the United States
shapes its legal claim to statehood. In particular, Puerto Rico's long colonial
history makes it different from, say, Nova Scotia, which has also made noise
about joining the United States. 22 5 As Rogers Smith puts it:
[T]he governing authority asserted by the United States over Puerto Rico is and
always has been substantially illegitimate, in violation of the U.S. Constitution and
the nation's broader political principles. Where that leaves the issue of Puerto Rican
nationality is in important respects unclear, but it does clearly mean that the United
States is not entitled to decide the status of Puerto Rico, at least not any further than
Puerto Ricans wish them to do. Puerto Ricans should be seen as legally entitled to
decide their status for themselves (a power that is arguably at the heart of national
identity). 226

This would mean that, if Puerto Ricans chose statehood, Congress would be
constitutionally required to go through the constitutionally-prescribed processes
for admission of new states, as discussed above. 227 There are at least three
reasons why this might be true.
First, one might reject the notion of "unincorporated territories" altogether
and say that, constitutionally, the United States can only acquire new territory by
eventually granting one of the following: (i) statehood (Hawaii and Alaska being
the two most recent examples); (ii) independence (Philippines); or (iii)
incorporation (Northern Marianas). Chief Justice Fuller suggested as much in the
InsularCases, rejecting the notion that Puerto Rico could be indefinitely treated
like a "disembodied shade."228 One can see the same basic theme in political
comments at the time. 229 Even the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, as noted above,
221. HAMER, supra note 202, at 179, 181.
222. FOLMSBEE ET AL., supra note 204, at 217.

223. Id.
224. An Act for the admission of the State of Tennessee into the Union, ch. XLVII, June 1, 1796,

Stat. 1.
225. Storer H. Rowley, Quebec Crisis Creates Talk About 4 CanadianProvinces Joining U.S.,
CHI. TRIB. (May 3, 1990), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1990-05-03/news/9002050757_1
newfoundland-premier-clyde-wells-meech-lake-quebec.
226. Smith, supra note 41, at 385.
227. Whether Congress would actually live up to this obligation, or whether it would be
justiciable, are separate questions.
228. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 272 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
229. 33 CONG. REC. 2067 (1900) ("I believe that we can only hold territory, as a nation, in trust
for the States that are ultimately to be-erected out of that territory. I believe that we can only hold the
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contemplated that the acquired territory would eventually be carved into
states.230
The passage of time alone is not enough to disregard the importance of this
promise. After all, Alaska was purchased from Russia in 1867 (apparently with
no promise of statehood),23 ' was made a territory in 1912, and eventually
achieved statehood in 1959. Bartholomew Sparrow notes that "the period
between the first petition or bill for statehood and admission as a state ... lasted
an average of more than thirteen years, . . . [and] for seven states, the process
took longer than twenty years." 2 32 But even the racially-charged Dred Scott case
was not so cavalier as to support permanent territorial limbo: "There is certainly
no power given by the Constitution to the Federal Government to establish or
maintain colonies bordering on the United States or at a distance, to be ruled and
governed at its own pleasure . . . . [N]o power is given to acquire a Territory to
be held and governed permanently in that character." 233 Indeed, the U.S.
Supreme Court has repeatedly described the Insular Cases as "involv[ing] the
power of Congress to provide rules and regulations to govern temporarily
territories with wholly dissimilar traditions and institutions." 234
Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman have pursued a similar line, arguing, as a
matter of enumerated powers, that the only constitutional basis for the federal
government's acquisition of sovereign territory is as an incident of Congress's
power to grant statehood.23 5 Applying this theory, Lawson and Seidman have no
specific objections to the acquisition of Puerto Rico, 23 6 while their "instinct" is
that the acquisition of the Philippines was unconstitutional because there was
never a reasonable prospect of statehood.237 Further, they insist that "the
constitutionally relevant moment is the moment of acquisition." 238 However,
they observe that, "[o]nce the acquisition has been constitutionally validated ...
[t]here is nothing in the Territories Clause that requires Congress either to admit
a territory as a state or to dispose of it (perhaps by granting independence) if
statehood ever ceases to be an option." 239
territory of Puerto Rico in trust for the sovereign State that will be some day admitted into the Union.")
(statement of Rep. McClellan).
230. SPARROW, supra note 15, at 14-15; see also MAX FARRAND, THE LEGISLATION OF
CONGRESS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ORGANIZED TERRITORIES OF THE UNITED STATES: 1789-1895,

at 53 (1896) ("That the Territories are to be regarded as inchoate States, as future members of the Union,
has been and is the fundamental basis of our Territorial system.").
231.

TED C. HINCKLEY, THE AMERICANIZATION OF ALASKA, 1867-1897, at 29, 36 (1972).

232. SPARROW, supranote 15, at 26.
233. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 446 (1857).
234. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957) (emphasis added); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553
U.S. 723, 759, (2008).
235. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 59, at 4 ("Whereas there is no constitutional problem with
the acquisition of territory that is intended as a future state, there are serious questions about the ability of
the United States to add territories that are not slated for statehood."); id. at 107 (noting that the likelihood
of statehood would be subject to a "reasonableness" test).
236. Id. at 111 ("Puerto Rico and Guam were acquired as spoils of the war, and both acquisitions
were clearly constitutional . . . . Puerto Rico, because of its hemispheric location, was probably an even
better candidate for statehood than was Hawaii.").
237. Id. at 113.
238. Id. at 203.
239. Id.
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We believe that the proper inquiry must take into account more than the
moment and mechanism of acquisition. Indeed, a second theory as to why Puerto
Rico can demand statehood now is that Congress and multiple presidents have
already promised as much and are bound by that promise. Precisely when that
promise was made is debatable, but there are at least three candidates. Those who
reject the notion of "unincorporated territories" might say that the promise was
made at the moment of acquisition in 1898, as noted above. Others might argue,
as a former governor of Puerto Rico did, that an "implied pledge of statehood
[was] made to Puerto Ricans when citizenship was granted." 24 0 A third, and we
think the strongest, possibility is that legal changes such as the passage of Public
Law 600 and the approval of the Puerto Rico Constitution in the 1950s not only
promised but actually delivered a form of statehood, or at least a deliverance
from the limbo of "unincorporated" status. 24 1
Additionally, for decades now, U.S. presidents have regularly expressed
willingness to accept Puerto Rican statehood. President Gerald Ford was the first
to do so, albeit in the waning days of his presidency, leading President-elect
Jimmy Carter to respond, "I would be perfectly willing to see Puerto Rico
become a state if the people who live there prefer that." 2 42 President George W.
Bush reiterated support for statehood in his inaugural speech,243 and President
Barack Obama said much the same a few years later. 244 Most recently, thencandidate Donald Trump said, "There are 3.7 million American citizens living
in Puerto Rico. As citizens, they should be entitled to determine for themselves
their political status."245 We do not venture to guess whether such rhetoric would
manifest in action, but its prevalence cannot be ignored.
That such actions could have constitutional significance has not gone
unnoticed. The Supreme Court has held, as recently as its 2008 decision in
Boumediene v. Bush, that "[i]t may well be that over time the ties between the
United States and any of its unincorporated Territories strengthen in ways that
are of constitutional significance." 246 And just a few months after Boumediene,
a federal district court in Puerto Rico followed exactly that theory in concluding
that, while the Insular Cases remain good law and Congress has not explicitly
moved Puerto Rico out of "unincorporated" status, "[a]ctions speak louder than
words." 247 Thus, "[a]lthough Congress has never enacted any affirmative
240. CABRANES, supra note 25, at 7 n.19 (quoting Governor Carlos Romero Barcel6, Address
before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council (Dec. 6, 1977))..
241. United States v. Quinones, 758 F.2d 40, 42 (1st Cir. 1985) ("Thus, in 1952, Puerto Rico
ceased being a territory of the United States .... ); Mora v. Mejias, 206 F.2d 377, 387 (1st Cir. 1953)
("Puerto Rico has thus not become a State in the federal Union like the 48 States, but it would seem to
have become a State within a common and accepted meaning of the word.").
242.
243.

CABRANES, supra note 25, at 11 & nn.30-31.
OOSTINDIE & KLINKERS, supranote 20, at 50.

244. See Helene Cooper, In Visit to Puerto Rico, Obama Offers (and Seeks Out) Support, N.Y.
TIMES (June 15, 2011), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9801E1D8143EF936A25755CO
A9679D8B63.
245. Chris Bodenner, The State of Puerto Rican Statehood, ATLANTIC (Mar. 7, 2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2016/03/the-state-of-puerto-rican-statehood/472599.
246. 533 U.S. 723, 758 (2008).
247. Consejo de Salud Playa de Ponce v. Rullan, 586 F. Supp. 2d 22, 41 (D.P.R. 2008) (emphasis
omitted).
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language such as 'Puerto Rico is hereby an incorporated territory,' its sequence
of legislative actions from 1900 to present has in fact incorporated the
territory." 248
Even if one does not believe that ties between Puerto Rico and the United
States have strengthened "in ways that are of constitutional significance," or that
the federal government is constitutionally bound to make good on its promises,
Puerto Rican statehood (or independence) might be required as a remedy for the
longstanding wrong of its unconstitutional status.
It is hard to ignore the degree to which race and racism played a role in
shaping Puerto Rico's political status, arguably raising Equal Protection
concerns. 24 9 It is black letter constitutional law that a showing of racial animus,
combined with disparate impact, can prove a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. 2 50 This is especially true when voting and other rights of political
participation are in play, and it is not necessarily enough to say that
contemporary supporters of Puerto Rico's second-class sovereignty are not
themselves motivated by racial animus. As far as the Equal Protection clause is
concerned, a law that was originally motivated by racial animus can remain
tainted by it decades later. In the 1985 case Hunter v. Underwood, the Supreme
Court struck down a 1901 Alabama law that disenfranchised people for
committing crimes of "moral turpitude." The Court found that the "original
enactment was motivated by a desire to discriminate against blacks on account
of race, and the section continues to this day to have that effect. As such, it
violates equal protection . . . ."251
Put differently, the history of the denial of the right of representation in
national governance to Puerto Ricans is largely a story of racism and
imperialism. The denial of those rights to Puerto Ricans should be
constitutionally suspect, requiring strong evidence that the denial of rights was
not motivated by racial animus. Best we can tell, there is no such evidenceother than perhaps the claim that at some points in time the inhabitants of Puerto
Rico have not wanted national representation because they were receiving tax
benefits or were seeking to maintain their culture of difference from the
mainland.2 52
But the very conceptualization of national representation as something that
248. Id.
249. It is also worth noting, as Judge Cabranes suggests, that matters were even worse vis-A-vis
the Philippines, which helps explain why Puerto Rico was kept as a territory. With regard to the
Philippines, ties with which would soon be severed, "[expressions of concern about the annexation of
Oriental peoples were commonplace," while "[t]he relatively tender treatment accorded to the Puerto
Ricans may be partially explained by the representations made in Congress concerning the racial
composition of the island." CABRANES, supra note 25, at 30-3 1. That said, there was plenty of racism to
go around. In his HarvardLaw Review article cited above, Simeon Baldwin suggests that it would be
unwise "to give to the half-civilized Moros of the Philippines, or the ignorant and lawless brigands that
infest Puerto Rico" the benefits of the Constitution. Baldwin, supra note 25, at 415.
250. Washington v. Davis, 426 US 229 (1976).
251. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985).
252. See, e.g., Luis Gallardo Rivera, Why Statehood is Badfor PuertoRico, LA RESPUESTA (Oct.
7, 2014), http://larespuestamedia.com/statehood-is-bad-for-pr. This cultural preservation argument has
apparently received consideration from the D.C. Circuit. See Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300, 31011 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
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could be traded away for tax breaks by one subset of citizens who are largely of
a different (and disadvantaged) race than the majority is itself problematic. As a
constitutional matter, voting is supposed to be sacrosanct. It is generally thought
to be both an individual right (that is, the collective cannot trade it away in
exchange for some other benefit) and an inalienable one (there can be no trading
of this right whatsoever, especially for financial reasons).2 53 Yet, for marginal
regions like Puerto Rico and American Samoa, courts and policy makers seem
comfortable treating the right to vote as being at the mercy of the local collective.
B. Expelling States?
Our focus here is on the legality of expelling territories-and specifically
Puerto Rico-rather than states. And to the extent that expulsion has even been
contemplated, a firm line has typically been drawn between expulsion of
territories and of states. For example, Sparrow notes that in a brief in Crossman
v. UnitedStates (1901), U.S. Solicitor General John Richards argued that "[t]he
only indissoluble, inseparable parts of the United States" were "the States of the
Union, the governing body." He did not believe there to be any power to
"disintegrate the Union" but did "believe there is power to dispose of territory
which simply belongs to the United States." 254
But it is not clear that the inquiry can stop there. Is statehood a safe harbor
from the kind of expulsion Ponsa-Kraus describes? 255 To consider the possibility
of expelling either states or territories, one has to start with questions about the
nature of the Union itself--questions that are thought to have been settled at
Appomattox, where the U.S. Civil War came to a close. And we are loath to
suggest disagreement with Abraham Lincoln about the permanence of the
Union. 256

Still, one might ask: What if the Union had blessed, or demanded, the
South's exit? Would that be an attempted secession (of a majority, perhaps), and
be analyzed the same way? If southern states had refused the demands of
Reconstruction following the Civil War, would there have come a point at which
unrepentant and widespread embrace of slavery would have been so inconsistent
with the national law and ethos that it could justify expulsion?2 57 Would
resumption of war have been the only alternative, and would that have been
preferable?
Because there is no explicit power to expel or deannex a state, any such

253. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1324 (2000) (describing
the general illegality and opprobrium attached to vote buying in the United States).
254. SPARROW, supra note 15, at 83-85.
255. See supra notes 82-83.
256. Abraham Lincoln, To Horace Greeley, in 5 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM

LINCOLN 388, 388 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) ("My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union,
and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would
do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some
and leaving others alone I would also do that.").
257.

See RALPH YOUNG, DISSENT: THE HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN IDEA 11 (2015) (noting that

abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison "eventually went so far as to propose that the United States abrogate
the Constitution . .. and expel the southern states from the Union").
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power would have to be found by implication in other constitutional powers.
And although state and national borders are often taken for granted today, the
location of those borders-and the concomitant power to shape them-were
central to the Declaration of Independence, the substance of the Constitution,
and the early development of the nation. 25 8 The Articles of Confederation's
inability to resolve border disputes between states was one of its central
defects. 2 59 But precisely because of those ongoing disputes and uncertainty,
"[tjhe Framers could .. . go no further than defining the basic components for
future mapmakers to assemble over time." 260
In doing so, they eliminated the Articles' provision regarding Canada's
accession to the Union, 26 1 arguably leaving the Constitution without a specific
2 62
mechanism by which the United States could acquire more sovereign territory.
This became particularly pressing when Thomas Jefferson was presented with
the prospect of the Louisiana Purchase. As Jefferson noted, "The [C]onstitution
has made no provision for our holding foreign territory, still less for
incorporating foreign nations into our Union. The Executive in seizing the
fugitive occurrence which so much advances the good of their country, have
done an act beyond the Constitution." 263 Notably, the debate over the
constitutionality of the purchase was not nearly so public as that over the status
of Puerto Rico.264
The legality of the Louisiana Purchase is accepted now, 2 65 but the debate

258. Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 7, at 28 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(suggesting that states, having "discordant and undecided claims between several of them," might go to
war over "vast tract[s] of unsettled territory within the boundaries of the United States"); Peter A. Appel,
The Power of Congress "Without Limitation ": The PropertyClause and FederalRegulation of Private
Property, 86 MINN. L. REv. 1, 16 (2001) ("[T]he Declaration of Independence cited [the British
Parliament's] transfer of land [from the colonies to Quebec], as well as other limitations that the British
had placed upon alienability of land in the West, among its justifications for severing ties with Britain."
(footnote omitted)). During the Constitutional Convention, Nathaniel Gorham asked, "Can it be supposed
that this vast Country including the Western territory will 150 years hence remain one nation?" NOTES OF
DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787: REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 410 (Adrienne Koch

ed., 2d ed. 1985).
259. See Michael S. Greve, Compacts, Cartels, and CongressionalConsent, 68 Mo. L. REV. 285,
proved inadequate to prevent disruptive controversies over ill297 (2003) ("These arrangements . .
defined boundaries, discrimination by some states against sister states, and infringements on the United
States through state treaties and agreements . . . .").
260. Allan Erbsen, ConstitutionalSpaces, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1168, 1173 n.14 (2011).
261. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. XI ("Canada acceding to this confederation..
shall be admitted into, and entitled to all the advantages of this Union . . ."); see also Murray G. Lawson,
Canadaand the Articles of Confederation, 58 AM. HIST. REV. 39 (1952) (discussing the reasoning and
historical context behind Article XI in the Articles of Confederation and the Founders' initial concern
with Canada).
262. See, e.g., SPARROW, supra note 15, at 1 ("[T]he U.S. Constitution itself has almost nothing
on the territorial expansion of the United States."); John Gorham Palfrey, The Growth of the Idea of
Annexation, and Its Breaking Upon ConstitutionalLaw, 13 HARV. L. REV. 371, 373 (1900) (arguing that
it is not likely that the later Constitution was meant to be less expansive than the Articles of Confederation
in this regard).
263. 10 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 7.n.l (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905).
264. Brook Thomas, A Constitution Led by the Flag: The Insular Cases and the Metaphor of
Incorporation, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE, supra note 8, at 82, 91 ("The constitutional debate
concerning the Louisiana Purchase took place exclusively in private correspondence and within the
conscience of Jefferson himself; the debate surrounding the Insular Caseswas very public.").
265. See John Hanna, Equal Footing in the Admission of States, 3 BAYLOR L. REV. 519, 528
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over the constitutionality of annexation has implications for the future of
constitutional authority over the nation's borders.2 66 If the power to annex can
be inferred from the Constitution, what about the power to de-annex or expel?
To the degree that control over borders is implied in the nature of
sovereignty, this argument has a lot to recommend it. In the debate over the
Louisiana Purchase, Representative Joseph Nicholson argued, echoing Justice
White's logic in the Insular Cases, that "[t]he right must exist somewhere. It is
essential to independent sovereignty." Representative John Randolph similarly
noted that "[ijf the old Confederation-a mere government of States-a loosely
connected league . .. could rightfully acquire territory in their allied capacity,
much more is the existing Government competent to make such an
acquisition." 267 As a matter of political practice and international law, cession of
territory has long been regarded as part of sovereign authority.
In the 1890's Jones v. United States (a case involving the status of the
Guano Islands), the Supreme Court said as much, while invoking its own case
law, first principles, and international law:
By the law of nations, recognized by all civiliezed [sic] states, dominion of new
territory may be acquired by discovery and occupation as well as by cession or
conquest[] ... . This principle affords ample warrant for the legislation of congress
concerning guano islands. 2 8

For those with a more limited view of federal power-or who are determined to
ground it in. specific text-there is an argument that de-annexing a state, or
ceding it to another country, would be beyond the enumerated powers of
Congress. Lawson and Seidman, for example, argue that there is no explicit
power of territorial acquisition, so any federal acquisition of territory can only
be "as a means of carrying into effect other national powers, such as the power
to admit new states or to provide and maintain a navy." 269
IV. EXPULSION, ACCESSION, AND COLONIALISM AS LEGAL

QUESTIONS

International law has focused on rules regarding expansion and secession
because they, rather than expulsion, have historically been the forces that needed
to be checked. But today, the former imperial powers face a different set of
incentives. Physical territory is not so valuable as it once was. Simultaneously,
citizens are potentially costlier, since it is legally, politically, and morally more
difficult to discriminate against particular groups of them.
(1951) ("If there were doubts as to the power of the United States to acquire [lands], these have been
resolved decisively in favor of the Federal government, not only by the Supreme Court but by the people
through their elected representatives in the Congress and the presidency.").
266. Although the constitutionality of the Purchase is relatively well-settled, territorial
annexation nonetheless raises important constitutional questions, which may have implications for
broader matters of constitutional law. Along those lines, see Daniel Rice, TerritorialAnnexation as a
"GreatPower", 64 DUKE L.J. 717, 722 (2015) (arguing that "the annexation of foreign territory is exactly
the sort of power that is too important to be left to implication through the Necessary and Proper Clause").
267. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 59, at 23 (quoting these and other statements from 8
ANNALS OF CONG. 499-510 (1803), but concluding that they "are not valid arguments in the context of
the federal Constitution").
268. Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890).
269.

LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supranote 59, at 5.
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The debate about Puerto Rico's status is but one exemplar of this broader
trend, and, as we have argued, presents legal as well as political questions. We
have argued that international and domestic law give the people of Puerto Rico
some right to control their destiny by resisting expulsion or perhaps even seeking
accession. Those two possibilities-a right to resist expulsion and a right to
demand statehood-might seem quite different. Some readers have suggested
that the former is obviously sound (albeit unlikely to arise), while the latter has
no strong legal foundation.
Logically and legally, however, the two arguments are deeply intertwined.
If one accepts the former, then the latter follows almost as a matter of course.
Recall that, on Ponsa-Kraus' persuasive reading of the Insular Cases, perhaps
the fundamental difference between incorporated and unincorporated territories
is that the latter are subject to "deannexation." If a territory can resist
deannexation (i.e., expulsion) then, ipso facto, it cannot be an unincorporated
territory.
If that conclusion is true, it does not follow that Puerto Rico automatically
becomes a state. But if it is not an unincorporated territory, then it must be an
incorporated territory. And that would put the island on course for either
independence or statehood: thirty-one of the current fifty states were once
incorporated territories, and we are not aware of any incorporated territory that
sought statehood and did not eventually receive it. 27 0 Given that statehood has
consistently and overwhelmingly outperformed independence as an option in
Puerto Rico's many referenda, we have every reason to think that statehood
would be the chosen option.
We do not mean to suggest that this is something like a legal "proof' of
Puerto Rico's eventual statehood. There are many ways-legal, political, and
economic-in which Puerto Rican statehood could be derailed. But the questions
we have tried to address here are not limited to Puerto Rico alone; they go to the
heart of foundational legal principles-many of them predicated on the notion
that nations will seek to gain, preserve, and defend territory. This is sensible,
since the history of the world has largely been a history of the expansionist
impulse. The colonial powers, after all, profited handsomely by denuding their
colonies of resources.
Today, the scales have tipped in the opposite direction. Tens of millions of
people-one-sixth of the Caribbean's population, for example-still live in
2 71
But these colonies now
colonies directly controlled by a distant metropole
often represent an economic burden, not a boon, for the nations that hold them,
and in no existing colony is there clear support for secession. If a push for
"independence" arises, then, it is more likely to come from the center than from
270. Opponents of Puerto Rican statehood sometimes suggest that there are no examples of
Congress being "forced" to accept a state. The example of Tennessee, as explained above, casts some
doubt on that proposition. In any event, if Puerto Rico became an incorporated territory, the burden of the
presumption would flip; one searches in vain for incorporated territories to whom Congress denied
statehood.
271. OOSTINDIE & KLINKERS, supranote 20, at 220 ("Of the total population of the Caribbean,
an estimated 37 million people, almost fifteen per cent live in areas which still maintain constitutional ties
with the mother country.").
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the edges. Law, we argue, may give the colonies-including Puerto Rico-tools
with which to resist.
This legal inquiry also has implications for scholars of colonialism more
broadly. At the moment, scholarly arguments about colonialism's legacy are so
feverish and bitter that they are making headlines in major news outlets.27 2 One
flashpoint of the current debate has been "The Case for Colonialism," an article
in which Portland State University professor Bruce Gilley argues that
colonialism was "both objectively beneficial and subjectively legitimate" in
many places throughout the world.273 The criticisms have been fierce.2 74 Third
World Quarterlyeventually retracted the article, 27 5 setting off a subsidiary debate
about academic freedom.276
Gilley is not alone in his views, however, and evaluations of colonialism's
legacy seem increasingly prominent.277 Oxford University has recently launched
a five-year academic project called "Ethics and Empire," which will reportedly
challenge the prevailing wisdom in "academic discourse" that "imperialism is
wicked; and empire is therefore unethical."278 Nor is the question of
colonialism's desirability limited to faculty lounges. In one recent British poll,
nearly half of respondents said that the British Empire was a good thing (fortythree percent), and something to be proud of (forty-four percent). 279 The
connection to current events is palpable. As one commentator puts it: "Why has
the debate erupted now? For many, the obvious answer seems to be Brexit." 28 0
In a world where borders and alliances are shifting, the evaluation of past
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arrangements seems all the more pressing.
It is frustrating, then, that the debate about colonialism's past proceeds as
if colonialism itself were past. It is anything but:
Portugal did not withdraw from its oldest colony, Macao, nor from its Atlantic
islands. Spain remained in two North African enclaves and the Canary Islands.
Britain and France kept a scatter of possessions around the world. Denmark
continued to influence Greenland and the Faeroes, and even the Netherlands held on
to two groups of islands in the Caribbean. European powers were not alone; the
United States retained "territories" and "commonwealths" in the Pacific and
Caribbean, notably Puerto Rico and Guam .... These various territories-or some
of them-may really be the last colonies. 281
Millions of people live in these "former" colonies. 2 82 For them, the question of
colonialism's benefit is not a historical counterfactual. And as Robert Aldrich
and John Connell note, "In every contemporary territory, powerful reasons exist
for choosing continued political ties with metropolitan powers; they range from
concerns over security (from local civil or political unrest rather than external
aggression), to dependence on transfer payments (in various forms) and access
to migration opportunities." 283
Contemporary discussions of colonialism should involve more than
counterfactuals about roads not taken. There are still roads ahead, and the big
question is who gets to choose them.
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